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Reinhabiting the Land: A Postmodern Gardener’s Perspective on Ecosystem 
M anagement
Director: Alan G. M cQuillan^,y^
In academ ia as well as practice, there is a  longstanding schism  between the a rts  and 
sciences th a t lends a  high degree of specialized knowledge, b u t little in the way of a 
complete or "holistic” understanding of the world. Increasingly, it is recognized th a t this 
atomization, invented a t the conceptual level and realized a t the effective level, prevents 
u s  from adequately addressing issues that permeate aU levels of existence, irrespective of 
disciplinary or m anagem ent boundaries.
This paper explores the discourse (and some might say practice) known as postmodern 
deconstruction in the liberal a rts and discusses its implications for practice and theory 
in the conservation sciences. Far from being some esoteric discourse restricted only to 
ivory-tower academics and marginalized artists, postmodern deconstruction is a 
pervasive phenom ena th a t has had profound and irrevocable effects on how we perceive 
and relate to nature.
The premise of postm odern deconstruction is th a t "nature" (like the rest of the 
phenomenological world) is a  construct — one particular, culturally determined, 
m anifestation of the "real. ' As such, it is subject to both deconstruction and 
reinvention. The discourse known as ecosystem managem ent engages in ju s t such an 
exercise. It proposes to reconfigure not only the nature of "nature," b u t to reinvent our 
relationship to it by reorganizing the economic, social, and political institutions tha t 
formcdize those relations.
I culm inate my argum ent with the suggestion tha t gardening, in a broad 
understanding of the activity, might serve as a  useful paradigm in which to ground our 
reconstruction of nature. It is a  broad based activity th a t encom passes both a rt and 
science, desire and necessity, and accounts for the role of culture and tha t of the real in 
the design of space.
If, as S tan Rowe contends, ecosystem management is not merely about managing some 
impersonal biophysiccd unit, bu t about re-inventing the "home place," then gardening, 
as  the a rt and  science of "place-making" will have m uch to say about how we might go 
about the construction of these m ulti dimensional, dynamic home places.
11
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Wildland resource m anagem ent is currently undergoing w hat some call a 
paradigm  shift: a radical reconceptualization of the frameworks th a t define both nature 
euid culture. It is called "ecosystem m anagem ent." This "paradigm" shift is not restricted 
to the discourse of resource conservation; it parallels movements in the hum anities and 
other sciences tha t have produced alternative world views such as ecofeminism, deep 
ecology, fractal geometry, chaos theory, and postmodern deconstruction. It is not simply 
th a t traditional paradigm s are incapable of accommodating new theories, b u t th a t new 
theories subvert the fundam ental presuppositions of the paradigms themselves.
Feminist theory critiques the hegemony of patriarchy; deep ecology the anthropocentric, 
industrial-utilitarian complex; and chaos theory the m odernist notion of determinacy 
and predictability. Postmodern deconstruction challenges W estern logocentrism; tha t is, 
it explores the  biases of our particular epistemological foundations th a t determine how 
we construct and then  relate to the world. In doing so, it effectively underm ines our 
dearly held notions of objectivity, knowledge, absolute tru th , authenticity, and, most 
importantly for this paper, our ideas of nature. The discourse known as ecosystem 
m anagem ent in resource conservation implicitly acknowledges these alternative 
positions when it adopts a "holistic" ra ther than  an  atomistic approach to nature and 
culture and concedes th a t m anagem ent is largely an experimental endeavor based on 
provisional ra ther th an  absolute knowledge.
This paper investigates the points of convergence between the discourses of
ecosystem m anagem ent and postmodern deconstruction. First impressions would
indicate th a t these two theories are not only incompatible, b u t tha t postmodernism, by
insisting on "relativism." actually underm ines the entire project of resource
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
conservation. I wish to suggest th a t a more careful reading of both theories with a  view 
to consensus rather th an  conflict will discover significant areas of agreement. Further, I 
believe th a t contrary to being the th reat tha t some scientists, m anagers, and 
conservationists might judge it, postm odern theory actually strengthens the position 
th a t ecosystem m anagem ent adopts toward the environment: one th a t is interactive, in 
which activities are contingent and knowledge provisional, and wherein hum ans are 
situated squarely in the m idst of a  world largely of our own making. Postmodern 
deconstruction presents new opportunities for creativity and inquiry th a t are 
unavailable within the scope of traditional scientific frameworks or approaches. 
Ecosystem m anagem ent, one could say, is a wildland "operationalization" of postmodern 
theory.
The thesis culm inates with an examination of gardening since the activities and 
perspective advocated by ecosystem management are similar to those practiced by the 
gardener. The rubric of gardening exemplifies both the deconstructive nature of 
postm odernism  and the participatory, adaptive approach of ecosystem mcinagement.
The investigation focuses on the evolution of nature as chronicled by gardening 
"grammar" and "syntax;" in other words, it reads the garden as if it were a  text that 
explicates the relationship of nature  to culture. The intent is to elucidate our evolving 
constructions of "nature" and the roots of our ambivalence about our place in the 
world.
The first hypothesis of my thesis is tha t "nature" and the "natural" — indeed, the 
whole known world — are sociolinguistic constructs. My second hypothesis is th a t the 
transgressive activities advocated by ecosystem management are consistent with viewing 
natu re  and culture not as imm utable absolutes, b u t as constructs in the hum an mind 
th a t evolve over time and place. And, finally, 1 will argue th a t gardening embodies the 
ethos sought by both postm odern deconstruction and ecosystem management.
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The Lay of the Land: A Reader's Guide
C hapter Two is devoted to an  explanation of postm odern deconstruction, 
specifically as it affects our notions of na tu re  and culture. It also investigates how 
postm odern theory h as been interpreted by some in the conservation community and 
responds to their more negative criticisms. Finally, I wlU suggest th a t far from foreclosing 
options for conservation m anagement, postm odern deconstruction presents a  myriad of 
new opportunities to re-vision ourselves and nature, and to reconfigure the pattern  of 
our relationship.
Chapter Three takes a  closer look a t ecosystem management, defining it in broad, 
theoretical term s and responding to criticism th a t it is arrogant and hum anist. The 
discussion focuses on similarities between ecosystem m anagem ent and postmodern 
theory, and suggests th a t hum anism  is the only possible frame of reference and tha t 
ecosystem m anagem ent might be construed even more broadly in light of what 
deconstructionism  h as to say about how we organize the world we inhabit.
Chapter Four examines the history of gardens and gardening with the intent to 
point out several things: first, th a t the idea of nature  (and hence the respective realms 
of na tu re  and culture) has changed over the centuries; second, and most importantly 
from my perspective, tha t the position adopted by gardeners with respect to the land is 
one th a t might be adopted by land m anagers today; and finally, tha t the spirit in which 
the activity of gardening is conducted is in m any ways similar to tha t advocated by 
ecosystem management. Managing ecosystems is about directing the inevitable chcinges 
th a t occur in the construction and evolution of the "home place." Gardening is about 
"place-making," about consciously and artistically combining and re-combining the 
fo u n d  with the m ade in the "home place." The gardener is able to reinhabit the 
landscapes from which the land m anager has been dispossessed because he is able to 
inhabit h is own creativity while accepting the biophysical limitations to its application.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A Word About Methodology
Since the thesis of this paper was of a theoretical nature, the bulk of research 
consists in critical analyses of relevant literature. Readings were widely varied to include 
selections from landscape architecture and gardening, a rt and social history, appropriate 
texts in postm odernism  and deconstruction, environmental history, recent publications 
in the theory of ecosystem and adaptive m anagement, and the texts of some of the more 
prom inent figures in the history of forestry, landscape gardening, wilderness 
preservation, and resource conservation. To the extent possible, original sources were 
used in preference to secondary interpretations.
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CHAPTER TWO
NATURE DECONSTRUCTED
It seem s reasonable to say that the postm odem 's initial concern is to de-naturalize some o f 
the dominant fea tures o f our w ay o f life: to point out that those entities that we unthinkingly 
experience as 'natural' (they might even include capitalism, patriarchy, liberal humanisrrO 
are in fa c t 'culturaT; m ade by us, not given to us. Even nature, postmodernism might point 
out, doesn't grow on trees.
Linda Hutcheon
The Politics o f Postmodernism
Introduction
"Nature" in a  postmodern, deconstructionist world is considered by some to be a t 
grave risk. At issue is the purported tendency of "armchair or coifeehouse" 
deconstructionists to dism iss the whole of "nature" or objective reality as naught b u t a  
product of language and culture, a  construction th a t has more to do with social 
convention and convenience than  with biophysicality.  ̂ There is a  widespread 
conception, particularly among those concerned with the environment, th a t the entire 
project of nature  conservation is underm ined by the view tha t nature is merely a  text 
authored by the  hum an mind, with relevance only to other texts, subject to critique and 
m anipulation without reference to any a priori ecological truth.^ After all, if the only 
thing we know of "nature" is a  "construction emerging from historically specific 
discursive, social, and cultural conditions. . . .why fight hard to preserve it?"^ This 
in terpretation of the implications of postmodern, deconstructionist thinking and 
experience is not entirely unfounded.
There is textual evidence to suggest tha t in a postmodern view all 
representations and sim ulations are "valid" because each is equally devoid of the reah
1 Michael Soule, ed.. Reinventing Nature: Responses to Postmodern Criticism,
{Washington: Island Press, 1995), p. 17.
^Ibid., pp. 20-21.
^Ibid., p. 47.
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the value of the representation lies only in its "striking resemblance" to the real "from 
which h as fled all meeming atnd charm. Jack  Turner in his essay The Abstract Wild 
expresses the sam e sentim ent from a  different perspective when he states th a t "if 
anything is endangered in America it is our experience of wild nature — gross contact"^ 
At issue — in a  world obsessed with production and reproduction, with copies and 
duplicates and replicates — is the "nature of authenticity and the authenticity of 
nature."® Some of the fear and disgust of postmodern views of nature  held by "anti- 
postm odernists . ' may, however, stem from a  misreading of such words as nature, reality, 
the real, and  the Other as they are used in a  deconstructionist context. The discussion 
in th is chapter wül attem pt to elucidate a postm odernist "position" on nature, one that 
need not be antithetical to conservation, and to explore the hypothesis th a t a more 
careful — or perhaps ju s t  different — reading of th is position may actually inform the 
discourse of conservation.
The first order of business, then, is to define the term s postmodern and 
deconstruction, since these words and concepts, while widely used in the hum anities, are 
little understood in the context of resource conservation. This discussion will revolve 
around the ongoing changes in the relative positions of hum ans to the world and of the 
sciences to hum anities. It also explores the central role of language in constructing the 
real and  questions our tendencies to attribute absolute truth to logical constructs. The 
second order of business is to identify the meaning of nature in the context of 
postm odernist deconstructionism . This entails an examination of the function and 
"proper" a renas of artifice and technology, and of origins and authenticity in the context 
of nature. Finally, 1 will suggest th a t the picture of hum ans and nature th a t emerges 
from postm odern deconstruction parallels th a t advocated by the discourse of ecosystem
^Jean  Baudrillcird, Simulations, (New York: Semiotext(e), Inc., 1983), pp. 44-5. 
®Jack Turner, "The Abstract Wild" in W itness (Winter 1989), p. 87.
®Soulé, p. 18.
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managem ent. (This connection will be suggested in th is chapter, b u t pursued a t greater 
length in Chapter Three when I discuss ecosystem management.)
Postm odem ity and Deconstructionism
Postmodernism
The term  postmodernism originated in architecture as a  description of the new 
eclecticism pervading architectural thought and practice in the 1950s.^ Postmodern 
architecture was a  response to the rigid formalism of modem architecture wherein "form 
followed function" and sterile, unadom ed, "inhuman" boxes proliferated in the urban  
and suburban  landscape (cf. the B auhaus and relentless rectilinearity of forest 
m anagem ent units). The postmodern architect, in contrast, selected and combined 
elements from a  host of genres including the classic, gothic, romantic, baroque, rococo, 
and modem. Modernistic glass and steel skyscrapers were crowned with odd, seemingly 
incongruous domes, fronted with Grecian pillars and crenellated with gothic 
battlem ents and gargoyles. The new eclectic style transgressed all formalized, traditional 
boundaries, taking w hat it liked and leaving the rest, creating a structure tha t defied 
cmy serious attem pts a t explanation and categorization within traditional frameworks. 
From architecture — in the restricted sense of the design of buildings and structures — 
postm odernism  spread to other disciplines wherein "figurative" space (i.e.; the space in 
which the activity of a rt is realized; the printed page, the stage, the canvas, sculpting 
material, etc.) was reconfigured into a  free style combination th a t mirrored the 
m etam orphosis taking place in physical space. Within a discipline, the rules that 
govemed creative acts were being ignored or transgressed: in music computers generated 
entire sym phonies and  in dance a duet could consist of one fat m an and a teapot.
^Hugh J . Silverman, ed.. Postmodernism  — Philosophy and the Arts, (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 85. Also see Chapter 1 of Charles Jencks' Postmodernism in which 
he discusses the roots of various postm odem  movements. Assigning a specific date is 
virtually impossible; some have postmodemism cropping up  in the 1930s, others as late 
as the 1980s.
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Boundaries between seemingly distinct and disparate disciplines like poetry and physics 
(cf. Frigof Capra’s The Too o f Physics or Gary Zukav's The Dancing WuLi Masters), 
literature and  biology (cf. Douglas Chadwick's A B east the Color qfW inteij, music and 
technology (cf. the performance techno-art of Laurie Anderson), or sociology and forestry 
(see articles in the August, September, and October 1994 Journal o f Forestry) were also 
becoming less rigid.
Expertise and specialization, while still perhaps inordinately valued, were 
increasingly viewed as insufficient in themselves to address issues tha t cut across a 
variety of disciplines. Another im portant aspect or characteristic of postmodemism is 
the sense of irony and hum or with which the postm odernist constructs the literal and 
figurative spaces of the world. It is not tha t nothing is taken seriously, b u t rather that 
creativity and imagination are freed from the constraints of rigid frameworks tha t dictate 
appropriate material, style, form, function, and subject m atter. The postmodernist is 
irreverent (think of Edward Abbey), recognizing no "sacred cows," no impermeable 
boundaries in science, philosophy, the arts, or literature.
Charles Jencks, in his book Postmodernism: The New Classicism in Art and 
Architecture presents (to the dismay of postm odernists who consider themselves to be 
beyond rules) what he term s the "emerging rules" or principles of postmodemism. 
Developed within the context of architecture, many of these principles apply equally well 
to the broader spectrum  of hum an behavior and experience. It is not surprising tha t the 
language bears a remarkable resemblance to tha t being employed in such diverse 
discourses as ecosystem management, conservation biology, fractal geometry and chaos 
theory. Jencks lists eleven tenets, some of which are relevant here. First among them is 
the "dissonant beauty" or "disharmonious harmony" of the new "convention" in which a 
"fragmented unity" is privileged over the "perfectly finished totality" of classical or 
m odernist traditions. (Compare th is with Daniel Botkin's choice of title for a text on "a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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new ecology for the twenty first century," Discordant Harmonies.^) "Disharmonious 
harmony" em phasizes "complexity and richness," favoring a  "Juxtaposition of tastes and 
world views" over monotonizing consensus and integration.® The second rule, 
pluralism , follows directly from {conceptually it precedes it) the first, and not only 
acknowledges b u t also celebrates "difference, 'otherness' and irreducible 
heterogeneity. (Compare th is with the notion of "complexity" and diversity in ecology 
and conservation biology.  ̂ His third and fourth principles concern contextuality and 
anthropom orphism  of space. That is to say, postm odem ism  allows for a construction of 
space in a  m anner th a t is com m ensurate with its locale, functions, and the desires of its 
hum an  inhabitants w ithout an  appeal to some singular external Ideal; it accounts for 
extant pa tterns and historical pa tterns while incorporating new technologies and 
designs. (An example might be found in the curren t concentration on 
bioregionalism. In doing so, it locates u s  within time, within the "historical 
continuum : " we are a t once reminded of the past (for which we develop a nostalgia) and 
th ru s t into the future (for which we have an  enthusiasm ). It also legitimates our 
inevitable tendencies — without limiting u s  to them  — to organize space in hum an 
term s and in scales perceptible to the hum an senses. Another quality of postmodemism 
is its double codir^ or use of "irony, ambiguity and contradiction" wherein the dilemma 
of "either...or" tha t is the necessary consequence of a  dichotomous exclusive framework 
is expanded to include a  fluid multiplicity characterized in the affirmation
^Daniel Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology fo r the Twenty-First Century, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
^Charles Jencks, Postmodernism: The New Classicism In Art and Architecture, (New York: 
RizzoU, 1987), p. 330. 
lOlbid., p. 335.
^^See Reed Noss and A. Cooperrider, Saving Nature's Legacy, (Washington. DC: Island 
Press, 1994). 
l^Jencks, p. 336.
l^See Daniel Kemmis, Community and the Politics o f Place, (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1990) or D. Scott Slocombe, "Environmental Planning, Ecosystem 
Science, and  Ecosystem Approaches for Integrating Environment and Development" in 
Erwironmental M anagement 17(3): 289-303, 1993.
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"both...and." The final "rule" of interest to u s is th a t of multivalence, a  quality tha t 
perm its a  variety of sim ultaneous interpretations, values, and  m eanings to be ascribed 
to any one phenomenon. (It accounts for the probability, for example, th a t a  particular 
landscape will be valued for a variety of reasons and will be expected to produce a 
m ultitude of goods and services.) In doing so, it also provides for a "continual discovery 
of new meaning" th a t accords with the "adaptive management" strategies now being 
explored in some areas of resource conservation.
Decons tructionism
While architecture was undergoing its metamorphosis, a  concomitant movement 
was occurring in linguistics and the literary arts. Known as deconstructionism  or post­
structuralism , it was a  reaction against (perhaps merely an outgrowth of...?) the 
structuralism  of linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure. S tructural linguistics, in 
keeping with the tradition of western classical philosophical and scientific thought, 
posits an  underlying framework or logos th a t exists independently of the hum an 
experience of language and the text (i.e.: it assum es th a t rules of thought existed before 
people started  thinking). Logos is presum ed to be an  a  priori condition of thought, 
and, a s the necessary precondition for thought, it cannot also be a product thereof. 
S tructuralists "discovered" (hypothesized) rules th a t govemed the texts' "underlying 
system of meaning." These rules were themselves considered to be autonom ous and 
took no account of the au thor's or reader's experience. The "aim" was to "define
1'^Jencks, p. 340.
l^Ibid., p. 342. For a  more in-depth discussion of adaptive management in resource 
conservation see  C.S. HoUing, Adaptive Environmental A ssessm ent and Management, (New 
York: Wiley & Sons, 1978) or Donald Ludwig, Ray Hilbom, and Carl Waters, 
"Uncertainty. Resource Exploitation, and Conservation: Lessons From History," Science 
260 (2 April 1993): pp. 17, 36.
l^David Crystal, The Cambridge Encyclopedia o f Language. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), p. 79. Text here is not confined simply to literary texts — the 
sort one buys in a bookstore like poetry, essays, scientific articles, novels, etc. — b u t is 
extended to include social, cultural, philosophical, political, or scientific orders. The 
term  logos is alternately translated as "word," "language," "logic " or "reason." For a  more 
complete definition and analysis of the role of logos, keep reading.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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universal principles of literary structure" in the hope of making literary studies into a 
scientific discipline th a t need not attend to "the role of the hum an mind or social 
reality." The attem pted rationalization of literature was b u t one small movement in 
an  ongoing effort to systematize those hum an institutions and endeavors th a t seem 
continually to defy limits. Structuralism  is "logocentric" — a  position which arbitrarily 
privileges logic, reason, or language over other modes of experience in m uch the same 
way th a t ethnocentrism  privileges one race, or anthropocentrism  privileges one species.
In th is framework logos/language is a  static structure with fixed m eanings th a t is 
impervious to existing "social, historical, or personal considerations,"^® Meaning is 
assigned and absolute; there is a one to one correspondence, an  equality, between a 
word and  the "thing" it signified, between language and reality. Basically, structuralists 
a ttribute to language and logic the same transcendent autonom y th a t Christianity 
a ttribu tes to God, th a t Kantian morality a ttributes to Ethics, th a t classical philosophy 
a ttribu tes to Truth, and  th a t Romantics attribute to Nature.
Post-structuralism , or deconstructiomsm, is a response to this idealized rigidity 
and autonom y granted to language, and by implication, to meaning and value. Jacques 
Derrida, writing in the 1960's took textuality to its furthest extremes when he said tha t 
language/logos was only a text, a  construct subject to the same vicissitudes as any 
other hum an  creation. The meaning and value of words, their inter-relations, and their 
connection with the reed is continually shifting. Logos itself has no privileged 
connection to reality, it offers a  unique view of the world, bu t certainly not the only one. 
It is, in the end, a  constructed medium through which we experience ourselves and the 
world; a  hum an-generated, human-specific vehicle through which we impose order upon 
and assign value to reality. Indeed, the only sensible experience we have of reality is
f^Ibid.
l®Ibid.
f ̂ Postmodernism does not deny tha t these ideals, structures, or concepts may exist. It 
simply says th a t we have absolutely no empirical way of verifying their existence, 
because we can never be outside of the frameworks that we use to prove their existence.
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through language, the only things we know about the world are the things available to 
our sensations, perceptions, and finally, our words. Unlike structuralism  or classical 
philosophy which seeks a transcendent Ideal model or external viewpoint from which to 
analyze, normalize, and finally justify hum an thought and activity, postm odem ism  
takes as its starting point the multiplicity of personal experience th a t informs meaning, 
valuation, and communication. It calls into question "the validity of the sets of 
oppositions (we] use  to th ink  about the world" and draws "attention to the multiple and 
overlapping m eanings of w o r d s . I t  leads finedly to the inevitable conclusion tha t if 
language/logos is b u t a  construct and if it is true tha t we experience ourselves and the 
world through language, then  we, as well as the known world, are constructs.
Language and the construction of the real 
Language, for the postmodernist, is perhaps the single m ost powerful tool 
available to the hum an species: it is after all, the "creator" of the world. Language 
msikes rational thought possible: not because it is primaiy, bu t because it is 
sim ultaneous. It is through language tha t the self constitutes itself a s  subject ("I"), 
objectifying the world, delineating object from subject and defining relationships. 
Language is the generative as well as the organizing principle of our universe: it is how 
we identify and then locate ourselves in space and time.
Looking more closely a t the nature  of language and a t its relationship to reality, 
Robert Pogue Harrison in his book Forests: The Shodom o f Civilization says th a t language 
"does not belong to the order of nature:" it is a  m anifestation of the "discontinuity 
between hum anity  and nature:"
20ciystal, p. 79.
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Language is a  differential, a  standing-outside of nature, an  ecstasis th a t opens a 
space of intelligibility within na tu re’s closure. Understood not merely as the 
linguistic capacity of our superior intelligence b u t as the transcendence of our 
m anner of being, language is the ultim ate "place" of hum an habitation. Before 
we dwell in th is or th a t locale, or in th is or th a t province, or in this or tliat city 
or nation, we dwell in the Ipgos.^l
The standard  translation for the Greek word logos is "language, " though it is also 
transla ted  as "thought " or "reason " and is the root of our own word " " lo g ic ."22 in some 
instances, logos is also translated as "word" as it is in the well known passage from the 
Gospel of Sain t John , "In the beginning was the Word: the Word was with God and the 
Word was G o d  " 23 And while the simplistic reading of th is verse equates "word" with the 
"Bible, " a  common alternative interpretation is tha t language or logic exists in the 
beginning.24 This need not m ean th a t it exists before there is a  hum an mind, bu t 
ra ther th a t language and thought are sim ultaneous, th a t logos is there a t the beginning 
of consciousness. In fact, we cannot "think" w ithout language.
Less commonly known, however, is the original meaning of the term logos, from 
lego, which mectns to " pick out," ""bind,"' or "gather together."25 (in keeping with the 
postm odern spirit it seems only appropriate to mention th a t "Legos ' are also those little 
plastic colored things th a t kids stick together to make all kinds of monsters, machines, 
buildings, and figures.) The familiar term "ecology" is from the Greek oikos meaning 
"house" or "abode" and logos Avith its dual sense of "language" and "gathering." One 
might then  say th a t "ecology " is far more than  ju s t  the science of ecosystems or habitats, 
b u t ra ther th a t language is the first home of humanity: and th a t it is through words 
th a t we gather together and order the world in such a way as to constitute an abode for 
hum anity. Again Harrison:
21 Robert Pogue Harrison, Forests: The Shadow s o f Civilization, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), p. 200.
22Liddell and Scott, A n Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1978), p. 476-7.
2 3 sa in t Jo h n  1:1.
24a  cursory glance a t Genesis also informs the reader th a t God created the world by 
speaking  it into existence: "And God said, let there be. . . ."
25Liddell and  Scott, p. 466-7.
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[Logos] is th a t wherein we dwell and by which we relate ourselves to th is or tha t 
place. W ithout logos there is no place, only habitat; no dom us, only niche; no 
finitude, only the endless reproductive cycle of species-being; no dwelling, only 
subsisting. In short, logos is th a t which opens the hum an abode on e a r t h .  ̂ 6
Language organizes the world for us, it locates u s and defines our relationship to 
"nature." It clearly differentiates hum anity from the world, b u t it also ju s t as clearly 
serves as the connector or mediator. For when reason/logos slips wildness comes 
rushing in to fill the gap; the mind in tu rn  hastens to repair the ren t by filling it with 
words, i.e., to babble. An unexpected encounter with wildlife has ju s t  such an effect: 
one rounds a  bend on the trail to come face to face with a  grizzly bear, or while out for a 
swim in the  ocean one is astonished to see a large fin surfacing a few yards away. It is 
generally in moments of u tter terror or sublime ecstasy tha t "words fail us," literally. We 
find ourselves in the m idst of an "unmediated" experience tha t exceeds our abilities to 
comprehend it linguistically or rationally; it is only in retrospect th a t we find ourselves 
able to describe or explain it (usually imperfectly) to ourselves or others. W ithout the 
binding properties of language and the organizing principles of reason all we know of the 
world is chaos emd form lessness — a  condition which if prolonged leads fincdly to 
madness.
But for some postm odernists language is also a  tool of power and of irrevocable 
violence. In psychoanalytic terminology, the constitution of the subject "1" is an  act of 
violence. In saying "1" one is forever separated from everything tha t is "not 1." There is 
now an  irreducible gap between subject and object, between 1 and "Other." (In the 
Lacanian cosmology, th is separation results in a  "lock" which sets up  the necessary 
conditions for desire, which is the motive force behind all subsequent hum an activities 
— another topic éütogether.27) For Jacques Derrida and the prominent anthropologist
26Harrlson, p. 200.
27jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psycho-Analysis, translated by A. 
Sheridan, (New York; W. W. Norton, 1973).
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Claude Lévi-Strauss, the very act of naming something, of speaking  about it, perpetrates 
a v i o l e n c e . 2 8  When we nam e (as Adam did in the Garden of Eden) we engage in an act 
of distinction and separation, of abstraction; of objectification th a t in the end smoothes 
the way (according to ecofeminists) for dismemberment and consum ption.^^ When one 
nam es something, one defines it, limits it. assigns it a  linguistic equivalent, a  meaning, 
and  a  value. The rational act of circumscription and appropriation precedes and makes 
possible the  political/physical act of mapping it out on or inscribing it into the 
landscape. In th is conceptualization of hum an interactions with nature, the act of 
violence begins with language and only finishes (inevitably) with "harvesting" the 
resources from the land. We are reminded th a t the referent, the real thing th a t is 
named, ultimately eludes our attem pts a t linguistic appropriation: all we get for our 
efforts is a  word. (Although nature  qua  the "real" obviously does not escape our physical 
acts of appropriation.) Roquentin, a  character in a novel by Jean-Paul Sartre 
encounters a  tree in his wanderings tha t inspires in him the following desperate 
thoughts:
This root — there was nothing in relation to which it was absurd. Oh how can I 
p u t it into words? Absurd: in relation to the stones, the tufts of yellow grass, 
the dry mud, the tree, the sky, the green benches. Absurd, irreducible; nothing — 
not even a profound, secret upheaval of nature — could explain it. Evidently I 
did not know everything, I had not seen the seeds sprout, or the tree grow. But 
faced with th is great wrinkled paw, neither ignorance nor knowledge was 
important: the world of explanation and reasons is not the world of existence.
A circle is not absurd, it is clearly explained by the rotation of a straight line 
segment around one of its extremities. But neither does a  circle exist. This root, 
on the  other hand, existed in such  a way tha t 1 could not explain it. . . This root, 
with its colour, shape, its congealed movement, was. . .below explanation.30
Roquentin's soliloquy expresses eloquently w hat Robert Pogue Harrison calls the 
"hum anist’s terror of a world th a t transcends hum an grounding. "31 That is, the fa c t of 
existence exceeds the limits of language and hence the grasp of our knowledge: as a
23jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976), p. 113.
2®See Carol Adams' The Sexual Politics o f Meat for an expansion of this argument.
30j, p. Sartre, Nausea, (New York: New Directions Publishing Co., 1964), p. 129.
31 Harrison, p. 147.
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child we are shown a rock and told "rock, " shown a tree and told "tree," shown the 
world and told "world" as if knowing the nam e gives u s  access into the reaL Being, while 
conceivable, is neither demonstrable nor representable. The sheer volume of our 
collective knowledge can sometimes effectively obscure the "abyss of non- 
comprehension" quieting our fears and belying our i g n o r a n c e . B u t  at other times all 
the available information cannot hide the fact of our trem endous ignorance about the 
world we live in. The ""terror"' th a t we experience when confronted with the inexplicable 
opacity and irreducibility of existence, however, need not reduce u s to nihilistic despair 
or resignation or even to a  frenzied undirected accum ulation of data. It can instead 
stim ulate directed curiosity, thoughtful observation, reflection, imagination and 
creativity. Imagine how boring the world would be if it were fully known.
Postmodern Deconstruction
A postm odern deconstructionist position then is one th a t does not reject the 
possibility of absolutes, bu t seeks to broaden the context to include the multiplicity of 
experiences. "Irreducible " concepts and irreconcilable categories like mind-body, reason- 
emotion, man-woman, right-wrong, civilization-wildemess, and natu re-art are exclusive 
ijdecds th a t fail to account for the majority of experience. Dualisms are not rejected, they 
are contextualized, located a t the extreme ends of a  spectrum  th a t is inclusive of varying 
degrees of reality. In th is sense postmodemity also moves away from the reductionist 
thinking so common in W estern culture; it accepts th a t while rules and abstractions are 
helpful, even necessary and inevitable, there are exceptions, variables which in the "real"' 
world cannot be ignored, disregarded, or reduced to zero. It tends to celebrate 
complexity, difference, and uncertainty. It adopts an  ironic stance with regard to the 
self-reflective/reflexive activities of the artist and the au thor who recognize the 
contingency of all their creative acts with respect to "reality, " yet continue to create in
32 john  Berger, About Looking, (New York; Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 3.
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the face of the uncertainty th a t arises out of th is contingency. Frameworks are 
constructed, b u t with ironic acknowledgment th a t they are all approximations,
Illusions, products of the hum an mind, subject to modification and refinement over 
time, some of which wiU prove more workable or desirable than  others, bu t none of 
which have an  objective, independent existence. Postmodemism allows for, indeed 
insists upon, operation within the grey areas th a t exist between the extreme absolutes 
of black and white. It does not say tha t absolutes do not exist — they are, after all, the 
subject of the sublime, philosophy, and science — b u t rather tha t since, for the average 
hum an, life takes place in the space between the absolutes, one might as weU develop a 
discourse to account for those experiences.
Postmodernist Readings of Nature
To those who predicate their argum ent for the salvation of nature  on its absolute 
existence, its separation from hum anity, or on "inherent value" and "natural or 
imm utable laws” a  postm odernist perspective th a t challenges or qualifies that 
absoluteness is extremely threatening. But w hat is the nature of nature in postmodern 
theory and how does it differ from or coincide with the real? By those who are 
persuaded in advance of its existence, the idea of doubting the reality of nature is not 
only absurd, bu t dangerous. In the book Reinventing Nature: Responses to Postmodern 
Deconstruction, ecologists, naturalists, biologists, historians, and philosophers take issue 
with w hat Michael Soule characterizes as the "deconstruc [tion of] both nature  and 
wilderness" by social critics who go so far as  to question even "their existence and 
essential r e a l i t y .  "^4 Soule's m isrepresentation of the postm odernist position stem s from 
his m isunderstanding of the function of the word "nature” in a postm odern context. A
^^In th is chapter, we are concerned with establishing a  postm odernist position with 
respect to na tu re  and its existence; chapter four addresses the evolution of the concepts 
of na tu re  and  wilderness through the course of civilization and our relationship to 
them.
^^Soulé, p. 137.
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deconstructionist does not "deconstruct” the real (which Soule conflates with nature), 
(this is be tter done with bulldozers and backhoes) bu t ra ther deconstructs the 
construction of the real th a t we call "nature" and the social conventions which we use to 
determine our relative position to it. As Chapter Four will reiterate, nature, as a  text, is 
under continual de-construction and re construction as is our valuation of and our 
relationship to it. A postm odernist may quibble about the existence of the real — it is. 
Anally, a  question to which the answer can never be verifled, so why bother — bu t it is 
rather more interesting and  certainly more fi*uitful to explore the ramiflcations of 
deconstructing the conceptual, social, and poUtical frameworks th a t posit the existence 
of an  objective, essential, absolute nature.
In support of the suggestion th a t postm odernists do not altogether disavow the 
existence of a  biophysical reality and our dependence upon it, I look to Jean-François 
Lyotard who is often quoted in support of precisely the opposite view. In an  essay 
entitled, appropriately enough, "Can Thought go on without a  Body?" he berates 
"philosophers" for wasting time asking insoluble questions while "the sun  is getting 
older. It wUl explode in 4.5 billion years" a t which time all the "insoluble questions wUI 
be done with too."^^ He elaborates:
It will be too late to understand th a t your passionate endless questioning cilways 
depended on a  "life of the mind" tha t will have been nothing else than  a covert 
form of earthly Ufe. A form of life th a t was spiritual because hum an, hum an 
because earthly — coming from the earth  of the m ost Aving of living things. 
Thought borrows a  horizon and orientation, the limitless limit cind the end 
w ithout end it assum es, from the corporeal, sensory, emotional and cognitive 
experience of a  quite sophisticated bu t deflnitely earthly existence — to which it 
is indebted as well."3®
His passionate support of "embodiment." while it does not lead him to an 
environm entalist stance, (his concern is ultimately for the preservation of "thought" 
beyond the death of the  body) locates hum anity in a  corporeal body which is in tu rn
^^Jean François Lyotard, The Inhuman, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 
8.
36ibid., p. 9.
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inseparable from the specific, if transitory, configuration of m atter and energy th a t is the 
Earth. Having done so, he next directs u s  to the "obvious fact of there being no nature" 
which he defines as a  seductive and comforting "congruence of mind and things." Yet in 
the  sam e sentence he reconfirms his belief in the existence of the "material m onster of 
D 'Alem berts Dream, the chôra of the Timeaus" or w hat we might call the reoL^^ At no 
point in h is essay does he deny th a t there is something "out there," something whose 
specific configuration of m atter and energy is essential to life, to w hat it is to be hum an, 
and  w ithout which all discussion is not only pointless, b u t impossible. T hat we think 
and  how we th ink  are an  inevitable result of our embodiment: to presum e th a t one 
could be disembodied, the task  of classical as well as modernist philosophers and 
scientists, is to be no longer hum an. Based on the above excerpts we might justifiably 
hesitate to enlist Lyotard in any conservation efforts; he apparently envisions the 
supernova of the sun  as the only possible obstacle to the survival of hum anity — all 
other catastrophes are b u t "pale simulations" of this one final "pure event" and th a t is a 
good 4.5 billion years in the future. W hat is important, however, is tha t he is a 
postm odernist who is clearly convinced not only of the existence of a  real b u t of its 
essential importance to "living creatures." Of interest to u s later on will be his 
discussion of m atter and energy, entropy, complexity, and his vision of the role of 
technology in facilitating and effecting survival.
J e a n  Baudrillard, too, is often cited as an example of one of those fellows who 
"have about them  no glimmer of the earth, of leaves or soil," who "seem to live entirely in 
the m ade world rather than  the grown world," and who m istake the making of language 
as analogous to the making of plastic trees. My understanding of Baudrillard is that 
his texts are  descriptive of the postmodern condition rather than  prescriptive and as 
such  m ight even be read as a warning to civilizabon about the state of its relationship 
to the  real When taken out of context, such rem arks as "the great referent Nature, is
37ibid., p. 11. 
38Soulé, p. 20.
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dead" are certainly cause for alarm.^® Baudrlllard's criticism is not so m uch th a t nature 
does not exist, b u t rather th a t it does not exist for m odem  society in any real way. 
Contrary to indicating any significant awareness of nature, our voluminous discourse 
on the  "environment" points instead to our aw areness of its absence and our growing 
unease w ith th is sta te  of affairs. The increasing frem y to "save" the environment, to 
enter into a n  "industrial contract" th a t offers "protection and security" is m easured by 
the num ber of nations, organizations, groups, and individuals who have added their 
voices to the d i s c o u r s e . 40 To Baudrillard the environmental disciplines take on the 
aspect of b u t one branch of "mass communication, a  gigantic ramification of hum an 
and social engineering . . .  a  network of messages and signs" whose laws are those of 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 41 in th is sense, twentieth century notions of "environment" differ 
radically from nineteenth century notions of "nature" which m ade reference to the 
physical or biological — "determinism of substance, of heredity and of species"— laws.42 
In a later telling passage he rem arks tha t
the mystique of the environment is proportionate to the moat between m an and 
nature which the system digs deeper every day, whether it likes it or not. This 
split, th is fundam entally broken and dissociated relationship...between m an and 
his environment is the raison d'être and the site of design. There it tries 
desperately to restore meaning, to restore transparency by m eans of a great deal 
of information, and "comprehension" by m eans of a great num ber of m e s s a g e s . 4 3
Hence "nature" is lost in the cultural abstraction of "the environment" and "to speak of 
ecology is to a ttes t to the death and total abstraction of n a t u r e . "44 other words, 
once we begin to speak about something, to render it linguistically, we tend to lose the
39jean  Baudrillard, For a  Critique o f the Political Economy o f the Sign, (St. Louis: Telos 
Press. 1981), p. 202. Despite being undeniably complex, often obscure and not entirely 
cogent or consistent, his argum ents are provocative and uncannily accurate in 
interpreting cultural trends.
4 0 l b i d . ,  p .  2 0 1 .
4 1 l b i d . ,  p .  2 0 0 .
42ibid.
4 3 i b i d . .  p .  2 0 1 .
4 4 i b i d . ,  p .  2 0 2 .
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experience of th a t something, i.e., we discourse on nature  in the comfort of our climate 
controlled homes and offices. Ultimately, it seems his message is th a t we no longer have 
(perhaps have never had) knowledge or experience of nature bu t rather a "multitude of 
signs," a  "discourse of the  environment," th a t has lost all connection with the "great 
referent Nature." Nature, it seems, has gone the way of Truth, Ethics, and the Platonic 
Forms £ind "saving" it has become an  exercise in scientific rhetoric and political savvy.
A symptom of th is cleavage is m odem  culture's fascination with simulacra, or 
representations of reality, and particularly of nature. In his book Simulations, 
Baudrillard m entions three orders of appearance: counterfeit, production, and 
simulation.^® For our purposes the m ost relevant order of appearance is tha t of 
simulation. We live in an  era where the presence of simulacra are so pervasive, so 
ubiquitous th a t the absence of the real is virtually undetected, aind its passing is 
mourned by only a  handful of true believers. According to Baudrillard, America is 
ground zero for the reign of the simulacra, and America is the fate of the world. 
Disneyland is considered to be the prototypical postm odernist simulation, the last and 
final comm entary on the fate of nature  in the American mind and landscape. 
Am usem ent and  them e parks like Busch Gardens, Epcot Center, and Seaworld; the fake 
w estern town near Gardiner, Montana whose name I forget: the fake. Indoor ski hills in 
Los Angeles and Dallas; or the wave pool in a  Phoenix water park are all examples of 
sim ulations. To those who are particularly cynical, Yellowstone and Yosemite are not 
far behind: they differ in degree, not kind. In an irreverent society cocooned in 
sim ulations, the very areas th a t were once established in a sincere effort to retain at 
least the possibility of "nature" or the "wild " become fodder for parody in a  process that 
belittles them  by virtue of association. The effect of the parody is two-fold: it points up 
the absence of the real a t the same time tha t it presents u s  with a  technological marvel 
th a t seemingly m akes the real redundant. We are a t once nostalgic for w hat is lost and
"^^Baudrillard, Simulations, p. 83.
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seduced by the beauty and intricacy of our technologically generated hyperperfect, 
hyperreal simulations.
Examples of w hat BaudriUard m eans surround us. As predominantly urban 
dwellers we are inundated with carefully choreographed images of nature in the media. 
Cable television brings the wonder of nature into the living rooms of thousands. How 
can a  stroll through Glacier National Park ever hope to exceed the visual orgy so deftly 
choreographed in an  episode of "Nature," "National Geographic," or "Wild Kingdom?" In 
the preface to his book of animal photographs. La Fête Sauvage, renowned photographer 
Frédéric Rossif rem arks of the contents th a t "each of these pictures lasted in real time 
less th an  three hundredths of a  second, they are far beyond the capacity of the hum an 
eye. W hat we see here is something never before seen, because it is totally i n v i s i b l e . "46 
Digitized compact discs surround house- or car-encased nature lovers with the truer- 
than-life sounds of whales, loons, and croaking frogs. Imagine listening to the perfectly 
reproduced sounds of howling wolves while trapped a t a  standstill on a Los Angeles 
freeway. W hat might have been a totalizing visceral experience is reduced to a  one 
dimensional sensory interlude tha t ends up being merely pleasant and diversionary — in 
Kantian term s, we trade in the sublime for the beautiful. We are in awe only 
incidentally of the sounds of a world to which we have previously been deaf, b u t 
primctrily of the  technological breakthroughs th a t m ake it avciilable to u s  in the comfort 
of our own homes. The media — with the aid of science and technology — provides us 
with a hyperreal composite of the world th a t far "out-natures" anything we might 
experience on our own. Interactive television is cdready on line; virtual reality is ju s t 
around the comer. "Nature" becomes entertainm ent, spectacle, a  showcase for the 
la test technological advancem ents.
4®Berger, p. 14.
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The nature o f technology
Which brings u s  to the hotly debated issue of the proper role of technology in the 
environm ental and conservation movements. Skirting the issue of w hether technology 
alone can "save" the environm ent or the hum an species, it is ironic th a t one of the most 
common uses to which hum an technology is p u t is saving or restoring nature. The 
extensive use of com puters in the natural sciences is b u t one example. W hereas in the 
"olden days" one simply relied on the five senses and solid logic to ferret ou t nature 's 
"truths." one now relies heavily on complex sophisticated devices of observation (satellite 
imagery and global positioning systems), m easurem ent (parts per billion), data 
m anagem ent (Geographic Information Systems), and analysis (simulation models and 
m ulti variate statistics). Contrarily, the increasing sophistication of our instrum ents 
(and th is can be construed to include the hum an brain) only yields an  increasingly 
complex picture of the world, bombarding u s  with information. The more we know, the 
more we realize w hat we don't know; knowledge only brings awareness of the depths of 
our ignorance. In keeping with our love and faith in technology, we are often inclined to 
find more information in a  computer generated landscape derived from a series of 
coordinates than  from a photograph of th a t same landscape or the view through a pair 
of binoculcirs or the sensations of standing in a  forest on a cold dark  night. Field work 
now requires a  thorough background in com puter technology and the latest software 
systems, since the researcher is Ukely to spend as m uch time in front of the terminal 
constructing models, generating systems, and plugging in data as out under the big sky 
comm uning with the conifers. And when we do venture out into the real, it is usually to 
collect observations and sam ples for analysis in the lab and to verify the correlation of 
our sim ulations to the observed world. We have what Bertrand Russell describes as 
knowledge by description rather than  knowledge by acquaintance. In another 
formulation, the more we know about the world, the less it is. Like it or not, our lives 
and our landscapes have become inextricably intertwined with technology. W hether
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one features technology as the destroyer or the savior of "nature" is in the final analysis 
a  moot point. For better or worse, the presence of technology shapes our perceptions of 
na tu re  and affects our modes of interaction with it. Already we and our world have 
about u s  the look of cybernetic organisms: indivisible amalgamations of organic m atter 
and energy, technology and cirtifice.
While some locate technology outside of na tu re  and even consider it to be 
antithetical to the natural, others are beginning to rethink th is position. In a novel 
perspective on the origins and proper location of technology, Lyotard asserts tha t 
"technology w asn 't invented by us hum ans. Rather the other way a r o u n d . H e  
continues:
As anthropologists and biologists admit, even the simplest life forms, infusoria 
(tiny algae synthesized by light a t the edges of tide pools a  few million years ago) 
are already technical devices. Any material system is technological if it filters 
information useful to its survival, if it memorizes and processes th a t information 
and makes inferences based on the regulating effect of behaviour, tha t is, if it 
intervenes on and im pacts its environment so as to assu re  its perpetuation at 
least.
In th is formulation technology, long considered an  act exclusive to hum ans, is 
attributed to nature  and to natural organisms a t l a r g e . U n d e r s t o o d  in th is way, the 
question of the application of technology in the service of nature and hum anity becomes 
one of how much, w hat sort, and where, ra ther than  one of " if or of polarized opposites 
th a t cannot exist in the same space lest one be canceled out (i.e.; the notion th a t a 
thing cannot be sim ultaneously natu ra l and artificial). In a statem ent th a t posits an  
even stronger affiliation between the hum an activity of techne and the creation or 
m aintenance of complexify, Lyotard rem arks "that technological-scientific development 
is, on the surface of the earth, the present-day form of a  process of negentropy or
^Lyotard, p. 12.
^®Ibid.
^^From Liddell-Scott Lexicon; techne: art, skill, craft; the way, manner, or m eans 
whereby a thing is gained or achieved without any sense o f art or craft
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complexification th a t has been underway since the earth  began its existence. We 
could stre tch  the idea even further to suggest th a t technology is simply an  extension of 
the activity th a t began with language or logos.
Authenticity, or the problem o f bear forgeries
Given the postm odern understanding of how it is th a t we construct nature and 
wildness, basing environm ental conservation or preservation on authenticity, "the myth 
of the pristine," becomes alm ost impossible. It may be beyond our abilities to reinvest 
managed "wilderness" with "wildness" in perhaps the same way th a t the reintroduced 
wolves in Yellowstone and the captive-bred condors in California are thought to have 
somehow lost, through hum an intervention, ideal wildness. We are saving their lives 
and the species (maybe), a t the cost, some would argue, of diminishing our perceptions of 
those lives, of circumscribing them  within the bounds of science and language and 
subm itting them  to a  political agenda. In the more m ilitant environmental fields, one of 
the strongest argum ents against the use of technology, against "restoration, repair, 
redesign, sustainable development, and managem ent of natural ecological systems and 
habitats" is th a t of "authenticity."^^ Eric Katz, in his article The Ethical Significance o f 
Hum an Intervention in Nature, calls it "faking nature," the equivalent of an "art forgery," 
"an unrecognized m anifestation of the insidious dream of the hum an domination of 
n a t u r e . I n  his estimation, any efforts a t management, mitigation, or restoration 
indicate suprem e arrogance, an  unqualified faith in the power of technology to fix all, a 
presum ption in the wisdom of hum anity to know w hat needs fixing, and a  license to 
continue doing business as usual. Rather than  take issue with his indictm ent of
^^Lyotard, p. 22.
^^Eric Katz, The Ethical Significance o f Human Intervention In Nature, (Restoration and 
M anagement Notes, 9(2) (Winter 1991), p. 90.
^^Ibid., pp. 90-91. The term s "faking nature” and "art forgery" are actually attributable 
to Robert Elliot who is quoted by Eric Katz. The use of the anailogy of an  a rt forgery may 
be ill-conceived; art, a s  Plato rem inds us, is already an imitation of an imitation, a 
sim ulation of the second order, an  imitation twice removed from reality.
5 3 i b i d . ,  p. 92.
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land m anagem ent practices and hum an behavior, a  postm odernist would remind him 
th a t authenticity  is a  moot point; we always have and  always will "fake nature." It is 
simply a  m atter of how well we fake it and how desirable the fake is: does it do w hat it is 
supposed to do or w hat we w ant it to do?
But questions of authenticity aside: is a  plamted tree or an entire forest really 
different from one th a t is grown "naturally?" a trapped, tranquilized, vetted, tagged, 
radio-collcired, satellite-tracked and  monitored wolf, elk, or grizzly different from one tha t 
is not? Can a  wolf, a  tree, a  forest be anything other th an  w hat it is despite 
questionable origins or attachm ents? 1 would answer no. W hat is it about technology 
and the "artificial" th a t leaves u s  feeling "outraged," dispossessed, and dissatisfied with 
w hat we have m ade of ourselves and the world? W hat if our fakes were perfect 
sim ulations so th a t no one could tell the difference? For modem, linguistically bound, 
self-aware, hum ans there is no chance of recovering an authentic or ordinal "nature" 
th a t m ight serve as a  tem plate against which to gauge the appropriateness or "rightness" 
of our actions. The preservationists fear th a t nature might become naught b u t one 
great cultural artifact is not unfounded, because from the postmodern perspective, 
"nature" is already a  product of the hum an imagination. There is, however, ample 
empirical evidence to suggest th a t there are "biophysical" (again, with the understanding 
th a t w hat is ecological or biological is also a  hum an value-judgment) limitations to our 
actions. W hat we do within the constraints of those param eters becomes a question of 
aesthetics: to the best of our curren t knowledge, we can either have no wolves or we can 
have radio-collared, satellite-tracked, "fake" wolves. The gap between w hat we know of 
the world and w hat it actually is irreducible and unknowable: it presents a  dilemma as 
well a s an  opportunity: it is a  m easure of our ignorance and uncertainty as well as tha t 
which m akes possible our free will. In tha t space between w hat we know and w hat is 
real, we have glissem ent, or slippage. It is th is slippage th a t affords u s  an opportunity to
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play, to create meaning, and to exercise choice. It can be the space of u tter failure or 
th a t of success.
Conclusion
Land m anagers today are faced with the onerous, seemingly impossible task  of 
meeting all the growing hum an needs and desires of a world th a t expects goods and 
services from a landscape th a t apparently has to rem ain pristine a t the same time tha t it 
yields more timber, more wildlife, and more water and minerals. Traditional 
m anagem ent m ethods are considered to have failed to m aintain the supposed original 
integrity of the landscape while meeting the growing dem ands of an  increasing hum an 
population. The dem and for wood and wood products has increased and will likely 
continue to do so. We seem to have an  insatiable appetite for energy in the form of 
electricity and fossil fuels, as weU as for water and space. And yet, more people than  ever 
are heading back to th is same nature for spiritual renewal and recreation with the 
expectation of "untrammeled" landscapes. We enthusiastically apply our industry, 
technology, and energy in the project of building a civilization or in harvesting resources, 
b u t we exercise a peculiar squeam ishness in then applying th a t same industry and 
technology in re constructing the fragmented landscape into something aesthetically 
pleasing, biologically viable, b u t frankly and inevitably artificial.
While a  significant portion of th is reluctance is admittedly economic, as noted 
above a t least some of it is attributable to our confusion and ambivalence about "the 
natu re  of authenticity and the authenticity of n a t u r e . "^4 ^  ^  culture, we hold firm to 
our ideas of the possibility of a  pure unsullied wilderness, despite all the evidence to the 
contrary. We are particularly resistan t to the idea th a t art, commonly considered to be a 
hum an  activity, and technology, a  hum an product, m ight have any part in its 
construction and m aintenance. In view of the above discussion wherein "nature" and
^ S o u lé , p. 18.
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"wildness" are already always linguistic and social constructions, the hum an presence 
in "nature" becomes a  m atter of degree, rather than  one of m utually exclusive extremes. 
Ja ck  Turner insists th a t "lw]e lost the wild bit by bit for 10,000 years and  forgave each 
loss Eind then  forgot.”^^ In its stead we have politiccdly determined managem ent units: 
federal, state, or city parks and forests, wilderness areas, wildlife reserves, sanctuaries, or 
refuges all of which contain within their boundaries some degree of wildness, of the real 
The only experience we have of the wild is through these simulations. The only reason 
we are even cognizant th a t they are wild and th a t we experienced them  is tha t we are 
capable of apprehending them  linguistically and organizing them  as thoughts, memories 
or reflections — an  exercise which simultaneously creates and nuUifies the wild. 
Wildness and wilderness are ideals to be desired, and th a t is finally the way we like it 
best: a s  an  idea it is great, b u t by God don't let the wildlife snatch  the poodle off the 
porch nor the wildfire b u m  down the house. All of these politically designated areas are 
more or less m anaged pieces of real estate, some of them might even be considered as 
products, carefully packaged for consumption by special interest sectors in the 
commercial m arket of hum an aspirations. Natural areas, for example, may not be 
roaded, b u t they are trailed, their rivers bridged, the trails patrolled, signed, mapped, and 
well traveled by nature enthusiasts. Je ts  fly overhead, as do satellites. They are 
bounded on all sides by other m anagem ent units, some of which are populated and 
"civilized." Travel w ithin these areas is restricted and often requires a permit; hikers are 
advised to stay on existing paths and to camp in designated spots only. Lawsuits are 
forthcoming when land m anagers neglect to inform Discovery-Channel-nature-lovers 
th a t the dangers of wilderness are not simulated: unexpected flooding happens and 
bears actually do kill and eat hikers.
So, w hat does postm odern deconstructionism  have to do with resource 
conservation or the m anagem ent of forests and wild lands? My sense is th a t it not only
®^J. Turner, pp. 82-3.
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provides a different perspective from which to assess current and historical patterns in 
the hum an-natu re  relationship b u t also offers a  language and perhaps even a  viable 
"philosophical" framework within which to situate ecosystem approaches to the 
m anagem ent of people, land, and resources. Postmodern deconstruction allows us to 
entertain  a wide variety of perspectives, relationships, and activities; it accounts for and 
reconciles technology, art. and "nature;" the real, imitations, and  simulations; ram pant 
consum erism , conservation, and preservation; and an  irrational nostalgia for a  pristine 
nature-that-never-w as th a t gets projected into a "desired future condition." It can 
accommodate contradictory, diametrically opposed truths; th a t hum ans are both a  part 
of and distinct from "nature;" th a t nature is a  construct within which we determine our 
actions b u t th a t our actions have real consequences in the real world; th a t we cannot 
ever know the real b u t th a t there are some "axioms" of existence th a t for all practical 
purposes might ju s t  as well be real. And finally, that within the irreducible gap between 
w hat we know and w hat is real there is space for the exercise of creativity and 
imagination, or if you will, for a rt and management.
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CHAPTER THREE
MANAGING AN "IMAGINED WORLD"
The fir s t creattoe accomplishment o f the mind is the world itself, the worid it constructs Jrom 
the buzzing, blooming conjusion o f stimuli w ith whichjrom  birth we are bombarded. Some 
unknow n mind-quality q j^ ia ted  with ourselves, but not necessanly so confined, builds 
mental models o f a  universe into which we enter as our common-sense world, finding it 
fijm ished  (though we have had a  hand in the interior decorations) with  constructs such as 
"mind" and "body," "spirit' and "matter." Rather than accepting these constructs as artistU: 
accomplishments, w e objectify them as realities that exist apartfrom  our perceptions and set 
out w ith the confidence o f science to explain what m akes them tick! We are naive realists 
chasing wUl-o'-the'wisps that may or may not prove to be the light
Stan  Rowe
Home Places. E ssays on Ecology
Introduction
Ecosystem management has recently emerged In resource conservation discourse 
and practice as the preferred choice for land management. In Its short tenure. It has 
garnered both considerable praise and scorn. Supporters hall It as a  more holistic. 
Integrated, and ultimately a more ecologically, socially, ethically, and economically viable 
approach to nature  and resource conservation. Detractors Vcuiously denounce It as 
being "more of the same," mere rhetoric, or categorically impracticable and quixotic. One 
of the more damning critiques articulated by one detractor Is tha t ecosystem 
m anagem ent Is simply yet another manifestation of the "arrogance of humanism." ̂  
Thomas Stanley, basing his accusations on David Ehrenfeld's book entitled The 
Arrogance o f Humanism, contends tha t the anthropocentric Interpretation of ecosystem 
management, as  expressed by authors like W. B. Kessler, Jam es K. Agee, and Daryll 
Johnson, and  practiced by the various federal land m anagem ent agencies, presum es to 
"m anipulate and manage ecosystems to satisfy hum an needs and desires while 
protecting ecosystem integrity. Unlike the "blocentric view" of ecosystem management
^Thomas R. Stanley. J r ., 'Ecosystem Management and the Arrogance of Humanism," In 
Conservation Biology 9(2) (April 1995), p. 255.
^Ibld., p. 256.
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favored by those like R. Edward Grumblne, Reed Noss, and Alan Cooperrider in which, 
according to Stanley, "hum an use  is considered as a  goal, perhaps achievable or perhaps 
not, which is constrained by the overall goal of protecting ecological integrity," the 
hum an ist or anthropocentric view subordinates the protection of ecological integrity to 
the overriding goal of "hum an use of resources or sustainability."^ In short, Stanley 
condem ns ecosystem m anagem ent because it presum es to "actively manage" a system in 
order to "achieve both multiple use and sustainabüity," all the while considering both 
the ecologiccd and social aspects of its m a n a g e m e n t . I n  Stanley's view, th is "belief in 
our ability to meet the assum ptions of ecosystem m anagem ent is unwarranted" and the 
whole project of ecosystem managem ent is simply "another example of the arrogance of 
hum anism .
This chapter examines the ways in which ecosystem management reflects our 
changing attitudes both toward the world and ourselves, and the implications of those 
changes for m anagem ent practices. I will suggest tha t not only does the bulk of 
literature on ecosystem m anagem ent not support Stanley's accusations of "arrogance, " 
b u t th a t in addition, as argued in Chapter Two, there is no alternative position from 
which to operate th an  th a t of "humanism. " Further, in direct opposition to Stanley's 
critique of ecosystem m anagem ent as yet another symptom of the hum an will to 
dom inate and  control nature, I will argue th a t by encouraging hum an interaction and 
participation in nature, and by accepting aggressive, intentional m anagem ent as a 
legitimate creative activity, we are thus granted the right, one might say, to "reinhabit " 
both our world and our own natures. 1 begin with an  examination of w hat Stanley (and 
Ehrenfeld) understand by hum anism  and its arrogance. From there, I proceed to 
examine ecosystem m anagem ent as it is characterized in the literature — its definitions, 
goals and  assum ptions — in hopes of countering Stanley's criticisms of arrogance and
^Ibid.
4lbid.
®Fbid., p. 255.
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presum ption. In doing so, I will not attem pt to argue th a t ecosystem m anagem ent is not 
hum anist, b u t ra the r s ta rt from the position th a t it can never be anything other than  
hum anist despite all misguided hopes to the contrary. Further, while some have 
undoubtedly adopted an  attitude toward nature th a t borders on arrogance, a  great 
m any practitioners and theorists in the field of resource conservation are a t least 
partially cognizant of the  contingency of their activities, the limitations of knowledge, 
and  the variable na tu re  of hum an institutions and values. Finally, while ecosystem 
m anagem ent may indeed have set itself too grand and comprehensive a  goal, I submit 
th a t it will fare better for having construed its mission and object too broadly than  it 
would had  it m aintained a  strict adherence to the predominantly reactive, narrowly 
disciplined, and  largely divisive approach historically taken to resource conservation.
The Arrogance of Humanism
Humanism, as noted in Chapter Four, and as acknowledged by both Ehrenfeld 
and Stanley, is a  product of the Renaissance, or the "age of hum anism .” It is also, as 
alluded to in Chapter Two, a  necessary and inescapable fact of life for those of u s  who 
are despite all efforts, hum an. Stanley, following Ehrenfeld's lead, "sets aside" the better 
parts of the hum anist doctrine in order to concentrate more fully on its destructive 
assum ptions and developments. For instance, Ehrenfeld acknowledges th a t hum anism  
is responsible for the positive notions of "hum an worth and dignity," and tha t it further 
(according to W ebster's Third New International Dictionary) '"rejects supem aturalism , 
regards m an as a na tu ra l object, and asserts...[man's] capacity to achieve self-realization 
through the use of reason and the scientific method. "’® The m ost fundam ental principle 
of hum anism , along with th a t of "final causes," is a  "supreme faith in humem reason — 
its ability to confront and solve the problems th a t hum ans face, its ability to rearrange 
both  the  world of Nature and the affairs of men and women so th a t hum an life will
®David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance o f Humanism, (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 
1978), p. 5.
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prosper."^ (The doctrine of final causes, a s Ehrenfeld understands it, "asserts...that the 
features of the natural world — m ountains, deserts, rivers, p lant and animal species, 
climate — have all been arranged by God for certain ends, primarily the benefit of 
mankind."®) The primary assum ption of hum anism  is th a t "all problems are soluble," 
from which optimistic beginnings a  series of secondary, equally "euphoric" assum ptions 
derive: 1) m any problems are soluble by technology: 2) those not soluble by technology, 
have solutions in the social sphere; 3) we will always act in concert in a timely m anner 
to resolve problems; 4) some resources are infinite, b u t those tha t are not have 
substitutes; and  finally, 5) hum an civilization will survive.® These assum ptions 
m anifest the "arrogance of humanism" bu t are no m eans adopted by all, or perhaps even 
most, hum anists.
Ehrenfeld's critique of hum anism  is supported by examples of ill-conceived efforts 
to control and alter nature. In George Stanley's view, eco^stem  management 
perpetuates and even expands this tradition of hum an arrogance since it presum es to 
manage the whole of nature  not only for the betterm ent of m ankind bu t of nature itself. 
He takes issue with our right to manage, with the necessity  of doing so, with our 
w illingness to do w hat is required when it is contrary to what is desired, and with our 
abüity to manage effectively. For example, he claims that ecosystem management "takes 
as a  given" our right to "use" nature for our own benefit. He further asserts th a t it takes 
as another given our right to "control " nature  because "effective stewardship m andates 
control. " Ecosystem m anagem ent assum es, despite centuries of evidence to the 
contrary, "that we will be stewards of the land because we can be, and because it is the 
only way to ensure th a t our multiple dem ands for resources, stable economies, 
recreation, biodiversity, ecosystem health, and so forth, are met."^® Stanley lists what 
he considers to be the four basic assum ptions of ecosystem management: "(1) that
7lbid.
®Ibid., p. 7.
®Ibid., pp. 16-7.
f®Stanley, p. 257. Italics added.
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science can determ ine how ecosystems function: (2) th a t once function is known, the 
social/political system will be able to protect ecosystems to the extent needed for the 
survival of hum an society: . . .  (3) tha t reality wül take precedence over political 
expediency because Mother Nature cannot be fooled: . . . [and (4)] th a t hum ans possess 
or can develop the technology needed to manage ecosystems."^ ̂  (It should be noted 
th a t h is list of assum ptions differs considerably from those of others more directly 
connected with the implementation of ecosystem management. See below for a partial 
listing. 12) Stressing the similarities between these tenets and those of hum anism , 
Stanley takes issue with each individually, demonstrating how they have failed us 
historically and thus how ecosystem managem ent is doomed to repeat the m istakes of 
the past. The cure for this, he suggests, is the adoption of the "blocentric view" of 
ecosystem m anagem ent and a concomitant rejection of the "anthropocentric-based" 
view and  its corollary "the doctrine of final causes."!^
Stanley's argum ent rests on several questionable assum ptions of his own. First, 
he assum es th a t ecosystem management indisputably relies exclusively on science and 
technology to successfully manage ecosystems. Second, he assum es that ecosystem 
m anagem ent — since it asserts tha t ecosystems will be managed for hum an benefit — 
will therefore disregard ecological constraints and the needs of other species. Third, in 
dem anding th a t we adopt a blocentric position, he not only assum es th a t there is an 
authentic, objectively verifiable, intrinsically valuable nature out there, bu t tha t we 
might somehow have access to it w ithout the mediating prejudices of our own peculiarly
1 ^Stanley, p. 257. The first three assum ptions are from J . Cairns, Jr., "The Emergence of 
Global Environmental Awareness" in Journal o f Environmental Science (China: 1990), 2: 
1-18. The last is Stanley's own addition to the list.
^2some of the basic assum ptions of ecosystem managem ent expressed by Had Salwasser 
are as follow; 1) all life on earth  depends on and results from processes th a t occur in 
ecosystems: 2) all life gets its basic resources from ecosystems and returns its "wastes" 
to ecosystems for "recycling": 3) the perpetuation of hum an life depends on prudent 
m anagem ent of ecosystems to produce needed resources and to sustain  capacity to 
renew productivity: 4) since we can never know everything and are constantly 
confronting "surprises," adaptive m anagem ent is more rational than  "control" 
m anagem ent: 5) all choices on what, how, where, and why to manage ecosystems are 
hum an choices: etc. Hal Salwasser, pers. comm. August 24, 1995. 
l^ibid., p. 261.
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hum an  epistemic lim itations and constructions. By denying hum ans the right to 
operate from within a "humanist" perspective. Stanley quite literally denies u s the 
possibility of any legitimate participation in nature. In doing so, he perpetuates the very 
dichotomies against which he claims to argue. After all, we can only operate from 
within the confines of our unique m ental pathways and linguistic peculiarities. There 
is, finally, no such thing as a  bio- or ecocentric position, except in so far as it is 
constructed, interpreted, defined, and valued by hum ans.
In my estimation, ecosystem management does not appear to harbor the saime 
"euphorically optimistic" arrogant assum ptions with respect to nature  and the activity of 
m anagem ent th a t m odem . W estern culture has traditionally held. It does, however, 
m anifest a  singularly hum anist (in the sense of anthropocentric) perspective of the 
world, b u t in doing so it seeks to "regard m an as a  natural object" distinct, bu t not 
separate, from nature. It seeks, in other words, to overcome the conceptual barriers tha t 
have effectively separated hum ans from nature in traditional paradigms. It does indeed 
presum e to m anipulate large tracts of nature for the betterm ent of mankind, bu t with 
the explicit understanding th a t the fate of nature, the final salvation of those natural 
processes and landscapes we hold so dear, is inseparable from the fate of hum ankind. 
Ecosystem m anagem ent does not claim that management for the Scike of management is 
inherently a  good thing, th a t science and technology can "fix all," nor that we will 
always act together in a  timely and appropriate fashion to ensure our survival and the 
quality of our environment, bu t ra ther tha t given population and consum ption trends, 
aggressive and creative m anagem ent of both ourselves and our habitat a t a  variety of 
scales and across a  variety of time frames is a  preferable alternative to the proliferation of 
irreparably degraded ecosystems and an attendant decrease in the quality of life. The 
following discussion of ecosystem m anagem ent addresses, among other things, the four
I'^Hal Salwasser, Factors Influencing the Context and Principles ojEcosystem  Management, 
(paper delivered a t the Conference on Ecosystem Management a t Utah State University, 
Logan, UT, May 1994; in press in conference proceedings), pp. 2-3, 8
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m ajor "assumptions" th a t Stanley accuses it of harboring: th a t ecosystems are fully 
knowable through science: th a t possession of knowledge ensures appropriate action; 
th a t "reality" will supersede efficiency; and th a t technology is a  "fix all" for 
environm ental and social im passes. It wül also consider the additional concerns raised 
by Stanley regarding our rights to manage, the necessity of doing so, our willingness to 
do w hat is required over w hat is desired, and our abiUty to manage effectively.
Ek:osystem Management
In direct contradiction to Stanley's understanding of it as a  perpetuation of 
hum anist hubris, ecosystem m anagem ent requires a "fundamental reconceptualization" 
of w hat natural areas and ecosystems are or "ought to be."^^ It requires th a t we re­
vision our "approach [to] nature, science, and politics" and th a t "we ask  ourselves w hat 
kind of society, and correspondingly, w hat kind of relationship with nature we want."^® 
In attem pting to answer these questions, ecosystem m anagem ent is, ideally, committed 
to seeking an  approach to resource conservation that wül "transcend arbitrary political 
and administrative boundaries." It aims to reconfigure the face of nature and in doing 
so dem ands th a t we restructure the social, political, academic, and economic 
institu tions th a t formalize our relationship with it. Ecosystem m anagem ent further 
proposes to redirect the course of environmental management by reforming the power 
and participatory structures, as well a s the ends, the means, and the nature of the 
m anaged object. In essence, w hat began in the 1970's and 1980’s as a  simple effort to 
reform m anagem ent practices and to redraw the lines of a few management units, has 
evolved into a  full scale critique of the fundam ental epistemological and 
phenomenological struc tu res tha t make u s  who we are and nature w hat it is.
l^H anna J . Cortner, et al., Institutioncd Barriers & Incentives fo r Ecosystem  Management. 
(Tucson, AZ: W ater Resources Research Center. University of Arizona, 1994), p. 2 
l®Ibid., p. 1.
Scott Slocombe, FromlTieory to Practice fo r Ekx)system'based Management, 
(Waterloo, ON, CA: Wilfred Laurier University, 1995), p. 2.
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Ecosystem management, like postmodern deconstruction (and, as wül be suggested in 
Chapter Four, gardening). Is transgressive; it seeks to move beyond traditional, 
m odernist paradigm s of nature and culture, to breach the effective emd conceptual 
barriers th a t inhibit creative approaches to solving environmental problems whüe a t the 
same time meeting hum an needs and desires.
Precisely because of its transgressive and holistic nature, ecosystem management 
is difficult to define. In fact, one of the major criticisms of the concept is that, despite a 
brisk  discourse and volumes of literature on the topic — to say nothing of num erous on­
going projects — it "continues to be vague and to m ean different things to different 
people." Indeed, it seems as though no article on the subject is complete without 
mentioning somewhere in its introduction tha t it is am orphous, too theoretical, clarifies 
little, or is perceived and interpreted too loosely, etc. So I shall continue the tradition 
and agree th a t (happüy) current definitions of ecosystem managem ent are rather more 
inclusive th an  exclusive, more suggestive than  interpretive, and more inspirational than  
commanding. This quality, incidentally, is aided in no smafi part by the fact tha t the 
phenom ena themselves ("ecosystems" and "adaptive management") are inherently 
indefinite and  resistan t to rigid quantification.
Even a  cursory survey of the literature suffices to demonstrate the diversity of 
circulating interpretations. Definitions of ecosystem managem ent range from being 
purportedly "ecocentric" in orientation to more or less unabashedly anthropocentric.
For example, the Society of American Foresters Task Force contends tha t "ecosystem 
m anagem ent is an ecological approach to forest resources management" which 
"attem pts to m aintain the complex processes, pathways and interdependencies of forest
 ̂̂ Keystone Center, National PoUcy Dialogue on Ekx>system M anc^ement: Concept Paper, 
(Keystone, CO: National Ecosystem Management Forum, The Keystone Center, 1994), p. 
2.
1 ̂ Keystone, 1994, p.2; Slocombe, p. 3; Robert T. Lackey. Seven Pillars o f Ekxtsystem  
M anagement, (A 1994 draft modified from a presentation given a t the Symposium for 
E cosystem  H ealth and Medicir^: Integrating Science, Policy, and Management, Ottawa. 
Ontario, Canada, Ju n e  19-23, 1994), p. 2;
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e c o s y s t e m s . " 2 0  The "condition of the forest landscape is the dom inant focus" with all 
other uses being subordinated to this one.^l Robert T. Lackey, deputy director of the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Environmental Research Laboratory, offers an 
explicitly anthropocentric or hum anist perspective when he suggests th a t ecosystem 
m anagem ent is the "application of ecological emd social information, options, and 
constraints to achieve desired social benefits within a  defined geographic area and over a  
specified period. "22
These definitions fail to offer anything new to the discourse of resource 
conservation in th a t they sustain  the old paradigms in which culture is irreducibly 
separated from nature; ecology, economy, and community are considered discreet 
entities: and  conservation is antithetical to preservation. Since the purpose of this 
paper it to dem onstrate how ecosystem management differs from traditional 
interpretations, how it moves beyond the "false ” dichotomies erected in Western thought 
and sustained  by our practices, I have chosen to focus on the broader, more integrated 
perspectives on m anagem ent expressed in definitions like the following. Alan Savory, for 
example, defines holistic resource management (frequently allied with ecosystem 
management) as "an approach th a t trea ts people and their environment as one whole. .
. . It derives from a view of ourselves and our planet as one ecosystem. . ." and requires 
the articulation of a  three-part goEil with respect to the desired "quality of life," a  
preferred "form of production" (expressed in "economic, social, cultural, aesthetic, or 
recreational terms"), and  a  "landscape description" tha t can ensure the m aintenance of 
the above desired c o n d i t i o n s .  23 Hal Salwasser, in defining ecosystem management, 
proposes "that knowledge and technology can be skillfully used in taking actions to 
encourage desired conditions of ecosystems for environmental, economic and social
20Society of American Foresters, Task Force Report on Sustaining Long-term Forest Health 
and Productivity, (Bethesda, MD: Society of American Foresters, 1993), p. xxi.
21 Ibid.
22Lackey, p. 23.
23Alan Savory, Holistic Resource Management, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1988), pp. 
xxi, 4.
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benefits, bo th  now and for future generations."^^ These and other definitions integrate 
not only ecology, economy, and society, b u t indicate a  willingness to consider the less 
"tangible," non-quantifiable values of landscape tha t nonetheless play a formidable role 
in our constructions of nature.
To some, these definitions function more as quixotic, theoretical ideals than  as 
realistic guidelines for the practice of land management. Each avoids promulgating any 
objective, normative conditions of the environment or society. In doing so they allow for 
the possibility th a t an  "ecosystem" might consist in any combination of "artificial" and 
"natural" elements, structures, and functions. By integrating and giving equal weight to 
ecological, economic, and social considerations a t the outset, they move away from the 
danger of privileging any specific approach, of requiring th a t any one "ideal" condition 
obtain irrespective of circumstance, place, or the desires of the inhabitants, or of 
oversimplifying w hat is inherently a  complex and interdependent set of issues, concerns, 
and phenomena. They explicitly recognize that hum an desires emd requirem ents (as 
expressed through the democratic process) are, for better or worse, the final arbiters of 
w hat will happen on the landscape, b u t suggest th a t stronger attem pts be made to 
modify and direct those desires with scientific knowledge of ecological constraints.
These definitions acknowledge the power of the hum an will — both in an  active and a 
metaphorical sense — in constructing the world to suit our needs and desires. They 
also, however, stress th a t there are some very real biophysical constraints th a t m ust be 
respected when we attem pt to impose those desires on the landscape.
A better understanding of the concept of ecosystem management is to be had if 
the term  is deconstructed into its respective elements. By defining the term "ecosystem," 
we can more clearly understand both the nature of "nature" and the nature of culture. 
My interpretation of th is revised (and still evolving) construction of the world differs in 
some significant ways from Thomas Stanley's reading of it as a continuation of old
24salw asser, p. 3.
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assum ptions and paradigm s tha t see culture and nature as m utually exclusive and 
Inherently antagonistic spheres of activity. Stanley directs some of his strongest 
argum ents against m anagem ent, both in presum ing to undertake the  task  a t all and in 
assum ing th a t we are capable of doing so with any degree of success. I intend, through 
an  exam ination of the principles and goals of adaptive m anagem ent (the approach of 
choice for ecosystem management) to point out how he again m isinterprets the 
underlying assum ptions th a t prom pt u s to take an active role in designing our 
environment.
Ecosystems: revisioning the landscape
In attem pting to answ er the question "what is an  ecosystem?" we sim ultaneously 
answer the questions "what is nature?" and "who are we?" Daniel Botkin, in his book 
Discordant Harmonies says th a t "nature is our mirror. The way in which we view 
ourselves . . .  is in part a  reflection of how we see ourselves in relation to n a t u r e . H e ,  
like m any others, understands th a t it is impossible to speak of nature  without a t the 
sam e time speaking of ourselves, to define ecosystems without at the same time 
betraying our perceptions of ourselves and our understanding of the place we have 
constructed ■within th is "imagined world." The conventional "proper place" of hum anity 
— predicated on the conceptual dichotomies th a t split nature  from culture and hum ans 
from anim als — has historically been outside of and superior to nature. Hence, our 
interactions with nature  have been characterized by exploitation and dominance; in 
short, by the arrogance of hum anism . In our unquestioning faith in the power of 
hum an reason and the doctrine of final causes we have attem pted to order the world to 
su it our needs. We have carved out of the landscape "management units" th a t better 
reflect our ownri epistemic limitations and economic needs than  the biophysical 
characteristics of the land. Our mistake, however, lies not in attem pting to bring some
^^Daniel B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A  New Ekology fo r  the Tw enty First Centwy, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 24.
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order to the  world, b u t in m istaking for real and necessary and right the contingent 
"artificial" order we have imposed upon an essentially chaotic nature. For example, 
because we can conceive of a  forest whose primary purpose is to produce wood fiber for 
hum an consum ption and another forest dedicated to the support of wildlife and the 
perpetuation of na tu ra l processes, we have dissected the biophysical landscape into 
industrial tree p lantations and national parks. The failure of these constructs to 
perform as desired, to produce wood in perpetuity or to support viable populations of 
wildlife, presents u s  with seemingly insurm ountable difficulties until we recall tha t the 
failure is in our models and constructs, not in nature. Linguistic constructs 
superimposed onto the biophysical landscape, like Nationcd Parks or city limits, have no 
obliged, objective existence in nature — they are merely conveniences th a t enable 
discussion and render m anagem ent a  possibility.
Ecosystem managem ent suggests tha t we might consider reconceiving our models 
to reflect more closely the observed phenomena, since to do so is easier (to say nothing 
of more prudent) th an  continuing increasingly costly and ineffective efforts to 
m anipulate the biophysical landscape to fit our will. My interpretation of the re­
visioning of nature  as an  ecosystem sees it not as an  extension of the "arrogance of 
hum anism " b u t rather as a  retreat from it. According to W ebster's New World Dictionary, 
an  ecosystem is "a system m ade up of a  community of [organisms] and its interrelated 
physical and chemical environment. "26 Note the absence of any stated normative 
principles or conditions with respect to size, structure, components, and function tha t 
m ight be construed as objective, ideal states of nature. And certainly there is no 
indication th a t the "doctrine of final causes" has any part in its formulation: in fact
2®Victoria Neufeldt, ed., Webster's New World Dictionary, Third ed., (New York: Prentice 
HaU, 1991). The term "community" here is obviously a  "loaded" one, to say nothing of its 
being a  distinctly hum an construct th a t is mapped out on an otherwise "unreadable" 
landscape. An ecosystem is not a  mere random  collection of disparate organisms and 
elements. The intent, it seems, is to convey the irreducible interconnectivity of aU the 
parts  and  participants in the functioning integrity of the whole; to convey the notion 
th a t tweaking one part has consequences for eveiy other peat.
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there is a  conspicuous lack of definitive purposiveness in the concept tiiat opens up  the 
field to a  myriad of possible configurations and combinations. (Ecosystem management 
itself, like hum an nature, is not without purposiveness or preferred objectives and 
desired states, b u t the thing managed — nature — is at least initially presum ed to be 
without the usua l normative ideals or a  hum anistic teleology. There is of course, the 
obvious value assignation inherent in the term  "community, " a topic which is addressed 
in slightly more depth on page 45 of this paper.) The term, thus vaguely defined, is 
equally applicable to a  drop of water or a  whole watershed: a  fallen l6g or an  entire 
forest; a  moose's stomach, a  moose, its entire home range, or the biosphere; the Bob 
M arshall W ilderness Area or the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem; even, it seems, the 
whole c o s m o s .  27 Ecological system s have no inherent boundaries and when we do 
assign them  "boundaries" we can arrange them  hierarchically, smaller ones nested 
within successively larger ones, across the biophysical, structural, and functional 
l a n d s c a p e s . 28 They are not discreet, independent units with impermeable boundaries, 
b u t instead exchange "goods and services" (sunlight and Los Angeles smog, for example) 
across metaphorical barriers. Some systems are more or less "intact," require more or 
less input from external energy sources, produce and export more or less waste, and are 
considered to be more or less efficient, productive, or desirable in the hum an scheme of 
things. But on the whole, an  ecosystem may be complex without being biologically 
diverse and  communal w ithout conforming to any particular orgemization or structure.
It may be inhabited by organisms of no specific sort and have a  physical environment 
th a t is not confined to a  predetermined location, type, or size. Finally, it may work or 
function w ithout fulfilling some specific process or goal.
27The Crown of the Continent ecosystem is generally defined by the Waterton-Glacier 
International Peace Park to the north, Missoula to the south, the Flathead Valley in the 
west, and  the Great Plains in the east. (Managing Ecosystems for Sustainable 
Development, FOR 595-5, Spring 1994).
2 ® D . Scott Slocombe, "Implementing Ecosystem-based Management" in BioScience 43(9)
(1993), p. 617.
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Tÿpically, more conservative less perspicacious thinkers tend to construe the 
ecosystem concept narrowly, to continue to insist tha t it is predom inantly a  natural 
comm unity composed of natural organisms tha t function together naturally. Needless 
to say, neither h um ans nor their artifacts are considered suitable candidates for 
inclusion in the ideal ecosystem. We are relegated to the s ta tu s  of anomalies, 
undesirable, yet unavoidable disturbances tha t m ust somehow be accounted for. A less 
extreme (but still conservative) view allows th a t "people cannot be separated from 
nature," th a t we are "embedded" in it; th a t our "cities, towns, villages, rural centers, as 
well as wilderness areas...[are] nested within ecosystems;" th a t our technological 
inventions and climate altering activities are an  integral, though not necessarily 
desirable, p a rt of n a t u r e . ^9 Subscribers to th is view even go so far as to concede tha t 
ecosystems themselves are, a t bottom, social constructs, the end-result of political 
discourse and social value-judgments, subject, in the final analysis, to the vicissitudes 
of hum an  desires and b i a s e s .  ̂ 9 g u t in the best tradition of postmodern deconstruction 
we owe it to ourselves to take the idea of an ecosystem to its logical conclusions; there is 
nothing th a t precludes its being an  amalgam of cityscape, farmscape, and wilderness 
inhabited by blue collar workers, cows, and grizzly bears; or from being an entirely 
"artificial" entity, like a  metropolitan area inhabited almost exclusively by hum ans, 
which requires the import of vast quantities of resources from external sources and 
exports a  varied array of both desirable and undesirable products. Hence, D. Scott 
Slocombe, a  Canadian environmental planner, dares to propose th a t ecosystems might 
as justifiably be defined on the grounds of purely social characteristics or 
"socioeconomic similarities" as on the biophysical similarities tha t are typically proffered
Ekiward Grumbine, "What is Ecosystem Management?" in Conservation Biology 8(1)
(1994), p. 31; Cortner, et al., p. 7.
^®Kai N, Lee, Compass and Gyroscope, (Washington, DC: Island Press. 1993), p. 11; 
Bryan G. Norton, "A New Paradigm for Environmental Management," in Robert 
Costanza, Bryan G. Norton, and Benjamin D, Haskell, eds. Ek:osystem Health: New  
Goals fo r Environmental Management, (Covelo, CA: Island Press, 1992), p.35.
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as the defining p r i n c i p l e s . T h e  resulting landscape patterns, whether we deem them 
to be draw n along natu ra l or political features are finally no less socially determined 
th an  those th a t delimit a  National Park, a  city limit, a  neighbor's baclqrard, or a  nation's 
borders.
More than  a  centuiy  ago the landscape gardener William Kent took the 
unprecedented risk of leaping the fence and proclaiming all nature to be a garden. In 
defining ecosystems, we too m ust be willing to transgress the conceptual barriers that, 
in a  fit of hubris Stanley and Ehrenfeld might say, we have superimposed on the 
physical and cultural landscape. We m ust, in essence, be willing to adm it (and then to 
act on th a t conviction) th a t the Bob Marshcill Wilderness Area differs in degree, b u t not 
kind, from an  Iowa cornfield; th a t the fate of Yellowstone National Park is inextricably 
bound to th a t of Targhee National Forest: and tha t the greater M anhattan metropolitan 
area is as  legitimate an  ecosystem as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. In short, we 
m ust be prepared to accept th a t each, in its own unique fashion, is a  complex 
community of organisms and its interrelated physical environment functioning together 
as a  unit. Agee and Johnson subm it, m uch to the horror of people like Edward 
Grumbine, th a t w hat is natural "cannot be scientifically resolved" because it 
"Incorporates value judgm ents. "33 i would go one step further and add th a t w hat is 
cultural is equally unresolvable. This does not m ean therefore, th a t any construct is as 
good as any other — even the m ost cynical deconstructionist will concede th a t some 
models better fit our purposes or seem to accord more closely with the observed 
phenom ena th an  others. At present, the ecosystem concept is ju s t another m etaphor in 
a  long list of m etaphors (Newton's clock, Bacon's autom aton. Lovelock’s Gala, etc.). It is 
a  m ethod of locating ourselves in the world and a way of establishing a context for
31f). Scott SIocombe, "Environmental Planning. Ecosystem Science, and Ecosystem 
Approaches for Integrating Environment and Development," in Environmental 
Management, (117(3) (1993), pp. 294, 290, 297.
32siocombe, "Implementing Ecosystem,...," p. 617.
33jam es K. Agee and Daiyll R. Johnson, Ecosystem  Management fo r Parks and  
W ilderness, (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1988), p. 10.
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hum an  activities. Its accuracy and its usefulness will depend on the degree to which we 
allow it to evolve over time and space, and its ability to accommodate new information 
and alternative, sometimes conflicting desires. J u s t  as postmodern deconstruction 
explores the limits of art, or as landscape gardening challenges the socially constructed 
limits of nature, so ecosystems transgress traditional paradigms of world order in an 
effort to reconfigure the landscape and redefine the place of hum anity and the scientific 
perspective.
An ecosystem refashions the natural landscape. In doing so. it also reconfigures 
the cultural, political, zmd economic landscape. It b lurs the conceptual boundaries tha t 
traditional paradigms have erected and perpetuated between the seemingly discreet 
spheres of culture and nature, in m uch the same way that our physical activities have 
effectively blurred the demarcations inscribed upon the biophysical landscape. Oil 
drum s on the coast of Antarctica, abandoned oxygen tanks on M ount Everest, Los 
Angeles smog in the Grand Canyon, the far flung effects of acid rain, ozone and rain 
forest depletion, and  a host of other extensive, hum an-generated modifications in even 
the m ost remote areas of the globe have destroyed forever the myth of a culture-nature 
dichotomy. Ecosystems, whether defined by natural" or "cultural" features, are 
considered to be fully integrated and interdependent (as conveyed by the use of the word 
"community" which implies a connectivity between all the elements and processes, 
hence intim ating th a t any activity involving one part has ramifications for all other 
parts), dynamic structural and functional "entities" tha t can be considered discreet at 
the conceptual level, for purposes of discussion, b u t not a t the practical level, for 
purposes of m a n a g e m e n t . I n  other words, we may divide the landscape by use- 
classifications, to speak of this un it as being devoted to grazing, tha t one to timber, and
^"^We can use any one component for purposes of defining an ecosystem ("ants, 
elephants, energy, or people") b u t tha t definition is nonetheless useful only for purposes 
of discussion. If one subscribes fully to the doctrine of the sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions, or on the "butterfly effect," an ts  and elephants and energy and people 
are still inextricably linked a t some level.
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th a t one to wildlife preservation, b u t neither the processes nor the organic or physical 
s truc tu res of the land respect or acknowledge these hum an classifications. An 
ecosystem is transgressive; it cu ts across conventional cultural, biological, geographical, 
structural, and  functional constructs and barriers. In doing so, the  ecosystem concept 
explicitly acknowledges th a t while there is definitely something "out there," how we 
organize it is, finally, a  function of social, scientific, and political institutions, values, 
and  conventions. We are inseparable from nature  because we create it, we define w hat it 
is, not ju s t  w here it is. To openly adm it th a t the world we live in is a  hum an construct 
is not to deny the presence of the real, b u t to acknowledge the intrinsic, inescapable 
lim itations and proclivities of our epistemic frameworks and to concede the contingency 
of our categorizing activities. To adm it of nature as a  construct is to retreat from a  
position of arrogance, yet to retain, perhaps even strengthen, our positions as hum ans. 
For ju s t  a s  the "proper place" — indeed the only place — of hum ans is in nature, so the 
proper place, a s well as the fate, of nature is finally in culture. We inhabit (in the fullest 
sense of the word) na tu re  since it is, ultimately, a  place of our own making, an  artifact of 
our need to locate ourselves symbolically in the real
M anagement
The dictionary defines "manage" as the ability to "handle or direct with a  degree 
of skill" or "to alter by manipulation." "Management" is "the act or a rt of managing" or 
the "judicious use of m eans to accomplish an end." Reconfiguring natu re  as an  
ecosystem and recognizing hum ans as not only the primary inhabitants b u t also the 
singular au thors of those system s have significant ramifications for the theory and 
practice of land meinagement. To the extent th a t an  ecosystem transgresses older 
models of nature  and the earlier boundaries erected by our social conventions, 
m anagem ent strategies m ust also transgress traditional m anagem ent paradigms, 
assum ptions, and institutions. To do so will require a  reformation of the power and
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participatory structures, a  redirecting of goals, and a  candid assessm ent of both our 
ability and  our willingness to achieve those goals in a  complex, indeterm inate, and 
largely unknow n world. The following discussion shows ju s t  how adaptive management 
re visions the role of m anagem ent in this ever-changing context.
Getting to Adaptive Management 
Traditional approaches to managing natural resources emphasize single- 
commodity production, based in large part on the hum anist doctrine tha t saw all of 
na tu re  as being naught b u t a vast resource storehouse for hum an use and 
appropriation; "trees were for logging, grass was for grazing, wildlife was for hunting.
The concentration on single-commodity production, in turn, resulted in similarly single- 
minded m anagem ent structures and strategies: an  approach which, not unexpectedly, 
fostered institutional competition rather than  cooperation. The development of 
centralized, professional agencies devoted almost exclusively to the management of 
specific commodities (Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service (timber). National Park 
Service (aesthetics and recreation). Bureau of Land Management (mining and grazing)— 
and, in keeping with the spirit of ecosystem management, we could include urban and 
regional planning agencies, family planning centers, etc.) institutionalized the 
fragmented approach to land management. Each agency had its own m andates and 
objectives, methodologies, areas of expertise, and power and participatory structures. 
Predictably, increasing fragmentation in the management structure resulted in a parallel 
fragm entation of the thing managed; nature. Rather than  tailoring m anagem ent 
institu tions’ m andates and methodologies to fit the landscape, we tailored the 
landscape to fit m anagem ent requirements and parameters.
^^Richard L. Knight and Sarah F. Bates, A  New Century fo r Natural Resources 
M anagement, (Washington, DC: Island Press. 1995), p. 1.
3®Slocombe, "Environmental Planning...," p. 290: Knight and Bates, pp. 40-41.
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In addition to being driven by single-commodity production, resource 
mamagement has a t times also been a  top-down p r o c e s s . T h i s  m anagem ent style is a 
holdover from the progressive era when centralized, federal control of resources was 
considered to be preferable and more efficient than  state or local control.^® Hence, 
decisions about the production, hcirvest, and allocation of resources were made not by 
those in the  field, b u t by bureaucrats in W ashington who might set timber harvest 
quotas based  on the financial bottom line rather than  on the biological capacity of each 
individual forest to m eet those quotas. Managers today are stlU often faced with having 
to decide between meeting today’s budget constraints and tomorrow's biological ones. 
Choosing to log with roads and tractor trailers ra ther than  with helicopters or horses, is 
one example in which economics (of one sort) often wins out over both environment £ind 
aesthetics — fuel consum ption of helicopters, obviously, is one of the factors tha t m ust 
be considered when deciding on the m ost environmentally "kind" method of harvest. 
While the failure of these top-down approaches is glaringly apparent today, the 
progressive m anagem ent paradigm that gave rise to these formal arrangem ents correlated 
conveniently with the deterministic, mechanistic model of nature  th a t obtained when 
resource m anagem ent was conceived.
Because we have reconfigured nature as a  dynamic ecological system that does 
no t adhere to m stitutional or ownership boundaries and th a t adm its of complexity and 
diversity, indeterminacy and chaos (as will be discussed below), we m ust also recreate 
our m anagem ent frameworks and goals in order to make them operational in the new 
context. Not only are practices being challenged, bu t the very paradigms and principles 
th a t motivate those practices are under scrutiny. We Eire questioning our right to 
manage na tu re  to su it our purposes; we have no clear, unified idea of w hat it is tha t we
^^Slocombe, "Implementing Ecosystem...," p. 613.
^®Knight and Bates, pp. 42-3.
^^It is only fair to mention here th a t the federal land m anagem ent agencies are now 
subject to the multiple use doctrine (Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 16 
U.S.C.A. ss 528-31) which requires federal agencies to manage leinds for a  vEiriety of 
services and products. It retains, however, an "output" orientation.
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need to m anage for; we have no confidence in our ability to achieve goals once identified; 
and the sheer complexity of the problems as well as the difficulty of implementing 
solutions tends to overwhelm even the m ost optimistic manager. Land m anagers are 
increasingly forced to identify goals w ithout hope of any "objective" confirmation of their 
rightness; to strive to reach those goals w ithout being able to clearly see the paths that 
will take them  there; and  to act w ithout fully understanding all the possible 
consequences of those activities across space and through time. Adaptive management 
has evolved a s  a  m eans of dealing with these uncertainties and the variable quality of 
natural system s while a t the same time providing a  reasonable foundation for activity.
Getting down the mountain in the dark 
Perhaps one of the greatest failings of land m anagem ent has been its inability to 
accept th a t there are limitations to w hat we can know about the workings of nature. As 
Slocombe sees it, our failures "stem a t least as m uch from planning and management 
problems . . .  as from lack of fundam ental knowledge about the effects of hum an 
activities."^® Recent work in the areas of "unknowledge and surprise," or ignorance and 
uncertainty, and their implications for environmental m anagem ent suggest th a t to be 
effective, new m anagem ent frameworks will have to develop methodologies th a t account 
for "irreducible ignorance, Generally, when faced with a problem to which the 
solution is unknown, we s ta rt with the assum ption (recall Ehrenfeld s and Stanley's 
eloquent critique of the 'arrogance of humanism" amd its basic assum ptions) tha t our 
ignorance can be "reduced or even completely eliminated" by "learning and scientific 
exploration."^^ And indeed, the project of science has always been to push  back the 
perceived limits of knowledge, to seek out new worlds, to boldly go where no one has
'^®Slocombe, "Implementing Ekzosystem... " p. 613.
Malte Faber, Reiner M anstetten, and John  L. R. Proops, "Humankind and the 
Environment: An Anatomy of Surprise and Ignorance" in Environmental Values 1 (1992): 
217-42, p. 219.
42paber, 218.
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gone before. . . as the  opening dialogue to Star Trek so eloquently rem inds us. "In the 
exuberance, which h as been brought about by the successful progress of science," we 
fail, as F. A. Hayek notes, to take "our ignorance. . . seriously. Any inquiry into 
solutions should begin w ith the question "What can I know?" The answer to this 
question (in an  ideal situation) would then determine the circum stances under which 
we would answ er the  questions: "What can we control? W hat possibilities for action do 
we have? W hat can  we do?"^^ But if we fail to establish the limits of our knowledge at 
the outset, then  we are likely to m isinterpret the corresponding limits to control, 
predictability, and possible activities.
In attem pting to address th is oversight in present environmental planning 
methodologies, Faber, M anstetten, and Proops give a  detailed "anatomical" account of 
w hat they call the "sources of surprise:" risk, uncertainty, and ignorance. Risk and 
uncertainty both proceed from situations in which the outcomes are all known. In the 
case of risk, the  probabilities are known and factored into the assessm ent; bu t in the 
case of uncertainty, while the possibilities of alternative outcomes are recognized, the 
probabilities of their occurrence are not all known, and hence, cannot be factored into 
the "equation." Risk and uncertainty éire both formally dealt with (more or less 
successfully) in current land management. A state of ignorance, however, ensues when 
the "outcomes are not all known." It is further classified into two types: closed 
ignorance and open ignorance. Closed ignorance is a  dead end (it is "the determined 
non-recognition of ignorance" th a t characterizes many of our activities with respect to 
the continued use of things like pesticides, nuclear power, etc. and might be called 
arrogance). Open ignorance is a  state in which one is aware th a t there are gaps in 
knowledge, th a t there are unknown variables, and hence, is open to "surprise" in the 
form of learning. Open ignorance is further divided into reducible and irreducible 
ignorance. Ignorance th a t can be lessened by research and by science is reducible.
^^Ibid.
^ I b id .
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Ignorance th a t cannot be lessened by education or scientific enquiry, on the other hand, 
is considered to be irreducible. Irreducibillty is a  function both of the "nature of the 
phenomena" (phenomenological) and  "the way we conceive the phenomena" 
(epistemological). Genotypic change — th a t is, change in the fundam ental gene 
structure  of an  organism th a t may or may not m anifest itself in the phenotype — and 
chaos (sensitive dependence on initial conditions) present phenomenological barriers to 
knowledge while herm eneutic (the constraints inherent in any language structure or 
system of communication), axiomatic (basic principles accepted as true without benefit 
of proof), and  logical constructs present epistemological b a r r i e r s . P o s t m o d e r n  
deconstruction poses an  equivalent formulation of this assessm ent of the limits of 
knowledge when it speaks of the opacity of the real and the inescapable constraints of 
logos.
The point here is to suggest th a t our approaches to identifying and solving 
environmental problems might benefit from a  general acceptance of our state of 
ignorance with respect to the world, both in its present and future states. Faber et al. 
suggest th a t ignorance "can be thought of as the context within which we hold whatever 
knowledge we have (or th ink  we have)."^® The management implications of this 
taxonomy of ignorance and knowledge are considerable. Typically, management 
identifies an  end and then sets out to pursue tha t end by specified m eans — means 
being determined by expediency, economics, politics, aesthetics, etc. But most 
importantly, the  whole activity of m anagem ent is predicated on the assum ption tha t not 
only can one identify an  achievable end, b u t one can also direct the course of action so 
as to unerringly achieve th a t end. The introduction of the possibiliiy of irreducible
^^The m eaning of th is sentence is th a t there are two basic sorts of limitations to 
knowledge: one is inherent in the phenomena themselves, the other in our modes of 
perception and  cognition. This entire paragraph is a  simplification of Faber et al.'s 
argum ent. For an  elaboration on chaos theory and the idea of "sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions" see Jam es Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, (New York: Penguin, 
1987.)
46ibid., 233.
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phenomenological and  epistemological ignorance into any system, however, tends to 
underm ine the  project of managing tha t system for any particular end.
All is no t lost, however, with the advent of "recognized" ignorance. After all, it is 
not as if ignorance did not exist before, b u t simply th a t we have neglected to give it due 
consideration when m aking our plans for the environment. Navigating within the 
context of ignorance is a little like trying to get down a m ountain in the dark: we have 
an  idea of where we w ant to be, b u t cannot see how to get t h e r e . C o m m o n  sense 
dictates slow, deliberate, motion, one step a t a  time rather th an  a  headlong rush. 
Confirm the results of the last step before committing to the next, and as a  corollary, 
avoid putting all weight on one foot until solid grounding is confirmed. If a  certain move 
is known from experience to have catastrophic results, do not repeat it. (We tend to 
know more about w hat does not work than  w hat does.) Conversely, if a  certain move 
has been used  successfully in the past, it is worth repeating if circum stances allow. 
Adopt an  attitude of "openness, creativity, and flexibüity" in looking for unexpected ways 
to reach the desired end.'^® But perhaps m ost importantly, be prepared to entertain the 
possibility th a t the desired end may be either altogether impossible or virtually 
impossible to reach from the present position. After aU, when navigating in the dark or 
m aking decisions in the presence of ignorance, it is only prudent to adopt an  attitude of 
humility ra ther than  arrogance.
Adaptive resource managem ent advocates ju s t such an iterative, "experimental" 
approach to managing ecosystems.'*^ It "assumes tha t scientific knowledge is 
provisional and  focuses on m anagem ent as a  learning process or a continuous 
experiment where incorporating the results of previous actions allows m anagers to 
rem ain flexible and adapt to uncertainty."^® It begins with an inventory of present 
conditions. Narrowly translated, th is m eans tallying up the available data  on species
am  indebted to Alan McQuillan for th is metaphor.
*8jbid., 239.
*®Lee, pp. 8-9.
SOGrumbine, "What is Ecosystem...," p. 31.
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and hab itats and  giving an account of the "state of the world." More broadly construed, 
it m eans taking stock of the sta tu s of our knowledge and giving ignorance its full due. 
The next move is to use our knowledge of present conditions to design options. This is 
the step a t which we are m ost likely to miss a  possible avenue because of epistemic or 
phenomenological barriers. Pursuing one option instead of another necessarily involves 
tradeoffs, so we m ust first evaluate (in so far as we are able) the benefits and costs 
associated with each option. At some point we have to stop deliberating and make 
choices — th a t is, we have to plan the course of action th a t will m ost likely realize the 
desired Jiitw e condition within the param eters of w hat we deem to be acceptable losses. 
Once the course is planned, actions are undertaken. The m ost critical phase of adaptive 
m anagem ent now begins: th a t of monitoring, of measuring, and of evaluating the 
responses of the environment to our actions. Again, due respect for ignorance is 
essential a t th is stage since slight modifications in the present circumstance may have 
immense unforseeable consequences for future states. Finally, we m ust be willing to 
adjust the course, even to modify the ends if necessary, to account for the results of our 
monitoring and  evaluations. The process then begins again.
Why Manage?
At some point in developing a  managem ent philosophy or practice, one m ust 
address the misgivings of those who are categorically opposed to the whole project of 
managing nature, and m ost especially, wilderness. The idea that nature is best able to 
handle its own affairs under na tu ra l conditions is undeniable. The difficulty is that 
population growth along with increased consum ption and waste production on the part 
of hum ans leads to inequity in resource allocation: diminished availability of land and 
resources: degradation of water, soil, and air qualify: conflicts over land uses: and a  host
^^See generally, C. S. Holling, Adaptive Environmental Assessm ent and Managewent, (New 
York: Wiley and Sons, 1978).
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of other problems that require management and regulation. 52 History has taught us 
tha t we can no more "leave nature alone" than  we can hope to tu rn  the whole into one 
giant commodity producing factory. In the first instance, we consume vast quantities of 
nature's products in order to survive. George Perkins Marsh pointed out in 1864 and 
Gifibrd Pinchot a t the tu rn  of the century tha t "leaving nature alone " results in over­
exploitation and unmitigated destruction. 53 The problem in contemporary society is 
even more complex since public outcry and lawsuits quickly ensue when laissez faire 
attitudes, like "let-bum" policies in Wilderness Areas or National Parks, threaten private 
property in adjacent lands or create undesirable air quality in d istant regions. In the 
second instance, we simply lack the necessary attributes of omniscience and 
omnipotence to implement effective "total-systems" manipulation and control. To date, 
attem pts to control and direct the processes of nature (as with channeling and damming 
large rivers) — which despite all of our knowledge is still mysterious and unpredictable — 
have been almost as devastating as leaving it alone was in the late nineteenth century.
Calls for minimal management and interference are laudable; bu t as long as our 
takings are a t maximum, our management will perforce be a t maximum. Increasing and 
conflicting demands do not allow u s the luxury of simply sitting back and letting nature 
take its course. Slocombe expresses the necessity of management when he states that 
"the expansion of planning interest from human-created and modified environments to 
the natural environment, from peoples" immediate surroundings to the entire biosphere, 
has been necessitated by the expansion of hum an activities themselves. "54 in all 
honesty, "nature" in some form or another will always exist. 55 The pertinent questions 
from the hum an perspective are: Under what conditions wlU hum ans survive? What
52$andra Postel, "Carrying Capacity: Earth's Bottom Une" in Lester R. Brown, ed.. State 
o f the World, (New York; W. W. Norton, 1994).
53Creorge P. Marsh, The EkxrthAs Modified by Human Action, (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1907); Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground, (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovitch, 1947).
54siocombe, "Environmental Planning " p. 289.
55Lee, p. 4.
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will be the quality of th a t survival and  existence? W hat sort of world do we w ant to live 
in? And w hat are we willing to forfeit to get it? These are the sorts of questions th a t 
m ust be asked and answered before maneigement plans can be developed. Management, 
within th is context, becomes not merely reactive, b u t more "pro-active" and creative in 
its efforts to meet peoples' needs as well as their desires across a  variety of spatial and 
temporal scales.
Reinventing M anagement
How and to w hat extent we manage reflects our attitudes toward the land and 
our assum ptions about our own abilities to m anipulate nature to su it ourselves. In 
adopting the more flexible, creative approach advocated by adaptive management, we 
explicitly concede the contingency of our knowledge and the limitations of our ability to 
successfully m anipulate a  dynamic and complex world. Rather than  assum ing a 
position of superiority and seeking complete dominance, adaptive managem ent assum es 
a  position of contextuality and interdependence tha t immediately precludes the 
possibility of total dominance. It does not assum e th a t we are w ithout the power or 
m eans to inflict cataclysmic and irrevocable changes on the landscape, b u t rather that 
in the in terests of survival a t m ost and aesthetics a t least, we might w ant to practice a 
little discretionary humility in designing our world. It brings to bear the sum  of our 
knowledge and our skills, gives ignorance its full due, and risks taking action in an 
indeterm inate, hum an-constructed world.
Holistic or adaptive resource m anagem ent suggests th a t those best suited to 
practice th a t discretion are the people who live in an  ecosystem, the "stakeholders." 
E co ^ stem s are habitats, "home places" not only to hum ans, b u t to a  m ultitude of plant
^®Due consideration m ust here be given to the ambiguous nature of the term "needs." 
Defining it is — or should be — a  never-ending cultural endeavor. W hat 1 am  trying to 
get a t here are the m ost basic minimum requirements of hum an survival: food, water, 
and air (again leaving aside any discussion of the quality of these basics). Beyond that, 
the question of "needs ' is a  hotly debated topic, in which the role of land m anagers is 
minimal a t best.
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and anim al species.®^ They are spaces — both figurative and  literal — carved by 
hum ans out of the wilderness of the real to su it our needs and to fulfill our desires. 
Home places are the sole suppliers of the resources on which we depend for life: they 
provide food for life as weU as food for thought. They are also the final recipients of the 
waste of our civilizations and  the by-products of our creative activities. Needless to say, 
the hum an inhabitants of a place will not always agree on w hat they w ant for their 
particular com er of the world. There is also no guarantee tha t those who live in a  place 
will always choose w hat is "best" either for it, the other inhabitants, or themselves: nor 
th a t in choosing w hat is "best" for themselves they will not knowingly shift the burdens 
of meeting their needs to other areas. (Hence, the powerful and essential role th a t a 
healthy, functioning participatory democracy plays in protecting the environment.^®) A 
keen sense of place is essential if environmentally viable and socially acceptable 
decisions are to be m ade by stakeholders. Wendell Berry cautions u s tha t technical 
expertise and  "expert advice" is of little value "if one's knowledge of one's whereabouts is 
insufficient, [and] if one's judgm ent is unsound. . . "59 By placing the burden of decision 
making and m anagem ent on the inhabitants of a  place, ecosystem management 
implicitly acknowledges, as did Gifford Pinchot, th a t the success of any conservation or 
m anagem ent plan is ultimately dependent upon those who live in and around the 
a r e a . GO "Home places " Eire not merely biophysical entities or geographical locations. 
They are complex, indivisible amalgams of orgamic elements and social, political, Eind 
economic values Eind institutions. To manage them  requires an equally integrated 
assortm ent of people and institutions, of values emd desires, of knowledge and technicEil 
expertise. Ecosystem memagement seeks to balance social amd economic development 
with environmentEd protection, not because the two are inevitably compatible, bu t
57gtan Rowe, Home Place: E ssays on Ecology, (Edmonton, Alberta, Canada: NeWest 
Publishers Limited, 1990).
5®See Kai N. Lee, Compass and Gyroscope.
G^Wendell Berry, What Are People For?, (Berkeley, CA: North Point Press, 1990), p. 5.
®(^Pinchot, p. 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
because it Is Impossible to go about the business of achieving one w ithout also 
achieving the  other. G1 To presum e to do so is to perpetuate the old ideas of 
independence, self-sufiiciency, and discreet or impermeable enterprises and entities, a  
m yth th a t the  integrated approach of ecosystem managem ent attem pts to overcome. 
There are always trade-offs, both on- and off-site effects of any activity undertaken (or, 
for th a t m atter, not undertaken) in any ecosystem. But with a  little willful creativity 
mixed with a  healthy dose of humility, with a  solid grounding in the ecological, 
economic, and social peculiarities of a  place, and most of all, a  willingness to be 
"surprised" by the unexpected, we should be able to reinvent our home places, ourselves, 
and the term s of the relationship between these.
Conclusion
On a simplistic level, ecosystem management is the conservation community's 
response to environmental degradation and the alarming loss of species, or 
biodiversity.®^ On a  deeper level, however, it is an  acknowledgment of the collapse of 
traditional ideologies, of m etaphors of culture and nature, and of management 
paradigm s th a t have precipitated the deteriorating conditions. According to Daniel 
Botkin "the failure of m anagem ent of living resources [is] a  symptom of the breakdown in 
myths, beliefs, and fundam ental paradigms that m odem  technological civilization held 
about nature. Ecosystem management suggests a new perspective, proposes an 
alternative conceptual framework th a t establishes a complex context within which to 
explore the implications and difficulties of practicing resource management in a 
postmodern, deconstructed landscape.
In my opinion, it is not in its assum ptions, b u t rather its aspirations, that 
ecosystem m anagem ent borders on the utopian ideal or arrogance. Ecosystem
G^Slocombe, "Environmental Planning,..." pp. 289-90. 
®^Grumbine, "What is Ecosystem...," p. 28.
G^Botkin, p. 24.
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m anagem ent envisions a  beüanced integration of ecological, economic, and political 
concerns th a t aims to produce and sustain  healthy ecosystems, vital communities, and 
quality life.®"  ̂ These goals are lofty, to say nothing of being eminently susceptible to 
individual interpretation, and hence, conflict. But I reiterate tha t it will fare better for 
setting its sights too high, casting its net too broadly, and transgressing too many 
boundaries, then  it would had  it confined its search for innovative solutions to 
unprecedented environmental problems to conventional avenues within traditional 
paradigms. The risks in "leveling the playing field," so to speak, as ecosystem 
m anagem ent does, are great: by acknowledging th a t an  ecosystem is a  social construct, 
it opens the way for competing world views that may not be compatible with current 
goals for resource conservation: by admitting to ignorance, it lays itself open to 
unending criticism and a  loss of public trust; by acknowledging th a t our abilities to 
achieve goals are limited, it sets the stage for a  backlash against any activity a t all; by 
soliciting public input, it creates the possibility tha t the voices of reason, science, and 
authority  will be drowned out by those of need, opinion, and desire; by conflating the 
domciin of culture with th a t of nature, it ru n s the risk th a t all of nature will become one 
great cultural artifact or science project. Most of all, rather than  being applauded for 
having the foresight to set its aspirations high and construe its mission broadly, it runs 
the risk of being scorned for naive idealism and failure to achieve those goals. Its 
success, in other words, wül be m easured not by how far it takes u s from where we were, 
b u t to w hat extent it falls short of taking u s where we expect to be.
To quibble about w hether we have the right to manage our environment is a  
moot point: we either do it by commission, with intentionality, creativity, and skill, or 
by omission, wherein the final design is a result of accident and coincidence. To 
question the necessity of doing so borders on m adness given our inexorable 
encroachm ent on "natural" spaces and inexhaustible acquisition of resources in the
®^USDA F orest Service, 1994.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
pu rsu it of survival and "quality life. "^5 To question our c±>ilities to manage nature  and 
ourselves effectively is only prudent given our past record — hence the "experimental" 
and  "provisional" na tu re  of adaptive management. And finally, tha t ecosystem 
m anagem ent has evolved a t all indicates a  glimmer of willingness to explore new and 
innovative approaches to age-old problems. Ecosystem management, as a  practice, may 
or may not succeed. B ut as a  theory, as a  new way of seeing ourselves and the world 
and the project of land management, there is little chance th a t it will lose the ground 
already gained.
Ecosystem m anagem ent might be said to be more of a  rhetorical trope — a phrase 
around which a  discourse revolves and develops, which may eventually give rise to a 
wide array of practices — than  an actual, set plan to manage the environment. As a 
focal point for discussion rather than  a  plan of action per se, it can accommodate 
shifting values and contradictory desires: function as a  context within which to assess 
new information and test the viability of new ideas; and explore the perceived barriers to 
ecological, economic, social, and political activities w ithout being forced to commit to 
any one specific plan of action. Ecosystem management legitimizes concerns tha t were 
ruled ou t in earlier, neirrower constructions of management. As an activity, ecosystem 
m anagem ent functions somewhat like an  asymptote: it plots a  course of action and 
m anagem ent th a t continually approaches, b u t never quite achieves the goals it sets for 
itself. It perpetually reinvents itself, adjusts its course and its desired outcomes as new 
information presents itself. One contributor to the discourse perceives ecosystem 
m anagem ent as b u t "a stage in the continuing evolution of social values and priorities; 
it is neither a beginning nor an  end."®® As a rhetorical trope, ecosystem managem ent 
m ight avoid (or a t least defer) the typical fate of any popularly accepted innovative 
perspective: once formally presented, an  idea tends to become institutionalized, to
®®niis statem ent assum es th a t our perceptions of hum an rights prevents u s  from 
controlling hum an populations to any great extent.
®®Lackey, p. 2.
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develop a  canon or doctrine by which it is constrained, calcified, and consigned to 
eventual obsolescence. In remaining steadfastly committed to m aintaining its own 
complexity and diversity, ecosystem managem ent retains its adaptability; and, by 
retaining its adaptability, it also facilitates its own survival.
The task  of ecosystem m anagem ent then, is to establish a  framework within 
which we can explore the imagined limits of our imagined world: to test the self-imposed 
boundaries th a t we have erected between the cultural and the natural, between urban 
planning, resource conservation, and wilderness preservation, between ourselves and 
our habitat. It is as m uch about managing people as about managing r e s o u r c e s . ^7 it is 
about m aking choices, about identifying desired ju tw e conditions within the constraints 
of w hat our knowledge tells u s is possible. It is also about a willingness to be surprised 
by our own failure to imagine.
®7Hal, Salwasser, "Ecosystem Management: Can It Sustain Diversity and Productivity?" 
Jow nalofForestry 92(8) (August 1994): p. 10.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FINDING THE GARDEN AT THE BOTTOM OF NATURE
...[TJhe idea o f a  garden — a s  a  place, both real and metaphorical, where nature and culture 
can be wedded in a  w ay that can benefit both — may be as usejid to us today as the idea o f  
wildemess has been in the p a s t
Michael Pollan,
Second Nature, 1991
Introduction
The preceding two chapters have been about transgression, about 
deconstructing the conceptual boundaries that effectively circumscribe our interactions 
with na tu re  and the world a t large. Postmodern deconstruction takes issue with the 
distinctions we m ake between life and art: reminding u s  tha t life — the world, nature, 
culture, science, philosophy — is an act of artifice, a  product of the creative and 
generative powers of language and the hum an mind. Its final message: we can change 
both the world and the character of our relationship with it by modifying our paradigms. 
Ecosystem management, one might say, is how postmodern deconstruction looks on the 
ground. It is one example of how we re vision the world, locate ourselves in it, and 
reform our activities. It seeks to overcome the barriers — the real ones and the 
constructed ones — th a t created and continue to sustain  atomistic approaches to land 
m anagem ent and resource conservation. It is also an effort to establish a  viable 
conservation agenda in a  newly "unbounded" world in such a  m anner as to legitimate 
hum an presence and participation in the natural order of things.
The subject of th is fourth and final chapter, by contrast, is the reconstruction of
the world through the  activity of gardening. Gardens are like texts that chronicle our
continuous de-construction and re construction of the spaces in which we live. They
are records of how mind affects m atter, how alterations in our paradigmatic structures
change the  ways in which we "write" the world into being. I have chosen to use the time
honored and  "field-tested" model of gardening as a  potential model for ecosystem
61
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m anagem ent for a  variety of reasons. The gardener, like the land manager, is in the 
business of organizing space based on both "found" and constructed differences, of 
m aking choices between w hat is culturally desirable (or undesirable) and w hat is 
"naturally" possible (or impossible). Gardens, like any "managed" landscape, occupy the 
limlnal zones, those middling areas between sacred and profane, between social culture 
and biological culture, between the real and our constructed imaginings — those places 
where the bulk of our daily existence is lived out. Hence, gardeners and land managers, 
a s  creators and stewards of these middle zones, know well the burdens and the rewards 
of making choices and designing landscapes in indeterminate, bu t not unbounded, 
contexts.
B ut there is more. The philosophical and operational position adopted by the 
gardener with respect to the "capabilities" of the land and the limitations of hum an craft 
is one suited to the land m anager who m anages a  deconstructed landscape for a 
postm odern society. ̂  Gardening, m uch like ecosystem management, is simultaneously 
deconstructive and reconstructive, transgressive and synthetic, creative and derivative, 
unapologetically hum anist w ithout being exclusive, and equally devoid of both romance 
(in the sense of an  illusory benign harmony) and hubris (in the sense of delusions of 
total, perfect control). By habitually working in the liminal zones, readily crossing the 
threshold between the natu ra l and the artificial, the gardener is comfortable with 
(though never blasé about) intervening in the affairs of nature on behalf of hum an 
desires. She is equally accustomed to having nature intervene in the afFairs of 
hum anity, despite her best efforts to the contrary. Additionally, the success of the 
gardener's a rt is determined by her ability to differentiate between what she w ants and 
w hat na tu re  will allow, and to combine elements of the wild with those of the cultivated 
w ithout unduly compromising the integrity of either one: to understand, in short, that
^Not all the practices and attitudes evinced by gardeners are desirable or ecologically 
viable: there are, however, some general ways of seeing the world that might prove useful 
in developing working paradigms for ecosystem management.
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the essence of gardening lies neither in hum an domination of nature nor the tyranny of 
a  deified natu re  over an  unresisting culture. Finally, the gardener's direct and intimate 
contact with the land provides her a  pragmatic "sense of place" th a t precludes 
hum anistic  illusions of perfect, total control, or alternatively, rom antic notions of living 
in passive, benign harm ony (i.e., living without weeding). Gardening is a spectrum  that 
ranges between the extremes of total control and pure romanticism
Gardens and Forests
The concerns of the traditional gardener are not far removed from those of 
forester or land m a n a g e r .  2 Both land managem ent and gardening ultimately come down 
to choices: choices about how to design the world, w hat products to cultivate or select, 
how to reconcile needs with desires with the capabilities of the land, and how, finally, to 
live Ü1 the world w ithout heedlessly compromising the integrity of nature or 
dehum anizing ourselves. Although in contemporary thought and practice we 
distinguish between gardening as a  "gentle art" and resource conservation as a  rigorous 
science," ecosystem m anagem ent adheres to a perspective tha t in m any ways harks back 
to traditional gardening paradigms by suggesting tha t we adopt a more interactive, 
inclusive, creative, and hum ble approach to dealing with our surroundings. Traditional 
land m anagem ent is utilitarian in aspect, with roots in the industrial, progressive era 
when land w as regarded as merely a  storehouse of raw materials awaiting harvest and 
use. 3 Traditional gardening, especially tha t practiced in the eighteenth century by the 
English landscape gardeners, focused not only on the aesthetic arrangem ent of organic 
m atter, b u t on the incorporation of the more practical necessities of life into the scheme 
of the whole. In m odem  society, however, gardening has been relegated almost
^One m ight recall th a t in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century —  the age 
when resource conservation in America was Just becoming an  issue — there was a 
journal entitled Garden and Forest edited and published by Charles S. Sargent, a friend 
and colleague of both Gifford Pinchot and Frederick Law Olmsted.
^Richard L, Knight and Sarah F, Bates, A New Century for Natural Resources 
Management, (Washington, DC.: Island Press, 1995), p. 1.
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exclusively to the sphere of culture. It is regarded largely as an  "unnatural" activity 
yielding "unnatural" products, because hum an artifice is involved in the creation of the 
landscape design, its m aintenance, and the selection of (usually) non-native plants. 
Gardening is something one does in the backyard, not in a national park.
The connections between gardening, land m anagement, and postmodern 
deconstruction are best elucidated through an  examination of the historical roots of 
W estern gardening. W hereas land management, as a scientific and political endeavor, is 
b u t a  century old, gardening is a  miUennia-old practice that, prior to the advent of land 
management, served as the primary mode of "communication" between people and 
nature. Hence, by looking a t gardens and geirdening history, we trace the course of 
"nature" through the annals of civilization and point up areas of convergence with 
ecosystem management. Further, it offers concrete historical evidence in support of 
statem ents m ade in Chapter Two to the effect tha t we create na tu re  — w hat it is, how it 
works, its proper relation to culture, and how we locate ourselves in it — and th a t our 
creations, like our understandings, change over time and space. It should be noted a t 
the outset th a t I am not suggesting we tu rn  every alpine meadow into a mown lawn and 
every forest into an idealized grove; rather, gardening is of interest because, as a record of 
the cultural roots of our sense of nature and our sense of place, it offers examples of 
how we might avoid old m istakes and choreograph both future landscapes and 
activities. For while the motive forces in landscape design are often assum ed to be 
predominantly aesthetic, they might more properly be considered reflections and 
derivatives of spiritual, political, scientific, or philosophical principles.
Taking gardening in the broadest sense and in keeping with the ideas expressed 
in C hapter Two, I would like to suggest th a t all lands — even those federal lands tha t 
comprise America's m uch vaunted "wild" west — are gardens because they are always 
and  already hum an artifacts, products of our imagination, if not our activities. In many 
respects, our gardens are like texts or geoglyphs, inscriptions left on the landscape as
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records of place. All nature  is a t bottom, a  garden, a  culturally constructed place 
wherein the  "natural." by definition, resides. Gardens themselves come in many forms, 
some inscribed into the mythic landscape (Eden and Arcadia) while others are worked 
out on the organic landscape; some are narrowly bounded by proximity to civilization 
and are seen in contrast to it, others stretch from horizon to horizon, occupying entire 
countrysides, perhaps even encompassing hum an settlem ents within their scope 
(historical perceptions of Italy as the "Garden of the World," or New Jersey, the Garden 
State). More or less artifice can be employed in creating a  garden landscape: the artistry 
may be solely resident in the mind or eye of the observer inclined to see the whole of 
nature  as a  garden; or, in contrast, it may involve extensive and intensive m anipulation 
of earth, rocks, plants, and water to create a very specific desired end. The mythical 
gardens, like those of Eden and Arcadia, or the literary gardens of Milton and Ovid 
exercise a strong evocative power over the hum an imagination and have proven to be 
inescapable creative stim ulants throughout Western history. These mythiced and 
literary creations are products of an  au thor’s, and hence a  culture’s, imagination; they 
are the loci of some our deepest desires regarding the "state of the world" and our 
preferred relationship to it.^
Garden History, or Mind Over Matter
It is in the geirden, or its m odem  manifestation the national péirk, managed 
forest, recreation or designated wildem ess area, th a t the terms of our relationship with 
nature are spelled out. Within these areas, our beliefs are tum ed  to practice, our word 
m ade flesh so to speak. It is alm ost certain tha t gardens in one form or another have 
been in existence since hun ter gatherer societies shifted from a  nomadic lifestyle to a 
more settled one of farming and herding nearly ten thousand years ago. W hat is not
^This is not to suggest th a t mythical and literary gardens are peculiar to Western 
culture; there is a well-developed Eastern tradition as well, a s  exemplified in the "Garden 
of God" m entioned in the Koran.
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clear, however, is exactly when the strictly utilitarian garden gave way to the pleasure 
garden — or even which really came first. ̂  The presence of pleasure gardens (or of 
national parks, wildem ess areas, recreation areas, etc.) in any society indicates not only 
a  certain level of affluence and hence of leisure time, bu t also a  degree of alienation from 
the source and  m eans of production th a t enables one to view na tu re  as an 
"environment," a m edium for pleasure rather than  simply as a  source of livelihood.®
This is not to suggest th a t earlier peoples failed to take pleasure in the happy accident of 
a shady grove or a  flower-strewn meadow, b u t rather th a t gathering decorative or 
ornam ental p lants with the in tent to create a space devoted to the enjoyment of these 
things (or preserving specific areas for their aesthetic values) requires free time, a 
modicum of security, and the distancing of oneself conceptually and effectively from the 
"naturcd" world.^
The Medieval landscape: nature enclosed
Unlike their Far and Middle Eastern counterparts, the earliest gardens of feudal 
and Medieval (roughly CE 500-1500) Europe were primarily utilitarian.® These gardens 
served to produce edibles, medlcinals, and other necessities for daily living, and there is 
little evidence to suggest th a t cultivators gave m uch consideration to the aesthetics of 
gardening, the implications of spatial manipulation, or had ciny ambivalence about 
redesigning nature to su it their purposes.® The practical necessities of eking a  livelihood 
out of an  environm ent th a t was far from benign often tended to cast hum ans and
^Documents dating from 2000 BCE indicate tha t the tradition of pleasure gcirdening was 
even then  firmly established in China. The East possessed an eloquent, clearly 
articulated landscape aesthetic, an  extreme sensitivity to and awareness of place, and a 
well-developed formed technique signifying a  consciousness of "nature" tha t would not 
become common in the West for several more thousands of years, (see Howard Loxton, 
ed. The Garden, (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1991), p. 12).
®J. B. Jackson, The Necessity fo r  Ruins, (Amherst: University of M assachusetts Press, 
1980), p. 37.
^Howard Loxton, ed.. The Garden, (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1991), p. 12.
®Tarsten O. Enge and Carl F. Schroer, Garden Architecture in Europe 1450-1800,
(Cologne: Benedikt Taschen, 1990), p. 23.
^Jackson, p. 38.
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nature  into adversarial, ra ther than  symbiotic, roles. The land outside a cultivated area 
was a  literal and conceptual "wildemess." a  place of danger, where social outcasts were 
exiled to live out their lives as "wildmen."
But by the twelfth century AD there are indications tha t small changes were 
underway in Europe. 10 'Troubadours of the cult of courtly love" began to cast their 
rom ances in garden settings and though we have little evidence of the content or 
purpose of these gardens, the very fact that nature — constrained, enclosed, ordered, 
and thoroughly tam ed though it was — was actually drawn into the sphere of hum an 
consciousness as a  setting for hum an "beauty and performance" m arks a  significant 
change in its status. 11 The literature and art of the later Middle Ages transformed 
nature  from an  essentially "unseen" chaos and wildemess to a  backdrop for hum an 
endeavor; the  "grass of the field" became the "carpet to dance upon, a lawn to tilt upon, 
or a  serviceable crop of hay." 1^ The particular "nature" favored and depicted by Medieval 
people w as highly stylized, and indeed, "all tha t was rugged, rough, dark, wild, and 
unterm inated” was rejected out of hand as "the domain of scdvage [sic] men' and 
m onstrous giants " while all th a t was "tender, bright, balanced, enclosed and 
symmetrical" was admired and hence suitable as an  object for civilized hum an 
interest.
l^Loxton, p. 24. Knights crusading in the Holy Lands in the 12th and 13th centuries 
would have been exposed to the luxuriant paradise gardens of the Arabs and it seems 
plausible th a t some of the ideas would have made it into the vem acular landscape upon 
their return  to Europe. In 1270, a  crusader returning to Picardy introduced hydraulic 
au tom ata and  water tricks into his gardens, both standard features of E astem  gardens, 
b u t of little practical value in a  garden devoted exclusively to the production of the next 
meal. Failure to mention the classical gardens of Greece and Rome should not be 
construed as an  implication th a t they are therefore unim portant or irrelevant: they 
simply fall outside the scope of the present discussion.
11 Ibid.
l^John  Ruskin, (Robert L. Herbert, ed.). The Art Criticism o f John Ruskin, (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), p. 311. A peculiarity in the art of the Middle Ages 
depicts the changing view of nature: in the th irteenth century, "landscapes" or elements 
necessary to marking the presence thereof, were set upon "checquered" backgrounds: in 
the fourteenth on golden backgrounds: and, finally, in the fifteenth century Üie sky, and 
a  horizon of sorts became more commonplace (Ruskin, 316). 
l^ibid., p. 311.
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The Church p u t na tu re  into the service of religion in the late Middle Ages. Ju s t  
as it wielded incredible power in the social and political arenas, so the Church also 
proved to be one of the  m ost influential purveyors of custom  and convention with 
respect to the function of gardens and the place of nature. Initial efforts were confined 
to rendering the garden in such a way as to symbolize various Biblical elements and 
events. Later efforts were more elaborate, moving away from the symbolic, to the 
representative or imitative — gardens became the Garden of Eden, ju s t  as anything 
beyond the garden wall became the conceptual and literal wildem ess to which Adam 
and E>e were banished after the Fall. The power and success of the hortus conclusus, or 
enclosed monastic garden, was predicated on the explicit difference (and hence 
juxtaposition) between the organized rationalization of the inner garden and the 
chaotic danger of the external areas. A small window in the wall of the hortus served to 
remind those enclosed within the reclaimed and m anufactured Eden of the 
consequences of sin. The hortus conclusus also functioned as a  m etaphor for the soul 
and good husbandry  of both soul and garden was taken to be essential to achieving 
eternal life. The gardener, attem pting to uncover the order of God's original creation, 
ministered to nature in  order to free it from the tyranny of post-Fall evil and chaos. In 
its religious context, "nature" did not represent itself necessarily, bu t was also a  sign of 
something else: in the garden, "nature " signified the original or redeemed state of 
hum anity, while in the wildemess, "nature " depicted the fallen state. Rendered thus, 
the power and the appeal of the garden lay not in its literal resemblance to Eden or in 
any particularly beautiful composition, b u t rather in the associative or signatory 
qualities of its iconography: to create such a garden required the combined talents of
^'^John M. Prest, The Garden o f Eden, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 21. 
For more comparisons of the hum an soul with the garden, see, among others, Psalms 
1:3, 52:8, 92:12; Proverbs 11:28, 30; Ezekial 19:10-11; Jerem iah 17:8, etc.
1®J. B. Jackson, The Necessity fo r  Ruins, (Amherst, MA: University of M assachusetts 
Press, 1980), p. 37. For further discussions of the connections between the state of 
na tu re  and hum anity 's moral character, see Genesis 3:17-24; Hosea 4:3; Isaiadi 51:3, 
11:1-9; etc.
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gardener, alchemist, astrologer, and p r i e s t N a t u r e ,  in the Medieval reconstruction of 
it, had  no formal character of its own, no inherent or intrinsic value; meaning and value 
tended to be derived through the symbolic order imposed upon it by religious and 
political institutions. E)ven today, in an  age tha t purportedly values wilderness in itself, 
we continue to labor under the old religious associations th a t burden landscape, 
tending to associate cultivated and ordered ones with virtuosity and unkempt, disorderly 
ones with laziness or a  weakness of spirit.
The landscape o f the Renaissance and E ^^h tenm en t' nature rationalized
During the Renaissance yet another layer was added to the already complex 
a ttitudes th a t humsins exhibited toward nature. It is to the Renaissance th a t we owe 
m any of our cu rren t ideas about na tu re  and humanity. Known as the age of 
Humanism, when the m easure of m an was the m easure of all things. Renaissance 
philosophy and  practice rejected the supernatural, the extraordinary, the mystical, and 
the unexplEiined in favor of the natural, proportionality, the "normal, " and the scientific 
method. It was an  age when faith in the hum an mind, in the power of Reason to 
surm ount any obstacle and to penetrate any mystery reigned supreme. Paracelsus, a 
sixteenth century physician and mystic, writes in a  particularly optimistic passage that 
"there is nothing in the depths of the seas, nothing on the heights of the firmament, 
tha t m an is unable to discover. "^O Classically educated and civic-minded, the
l^ ibid.
^^For an  expansion of th is idea, see David R. Williams, Wilderness Lost: The Religious 
Origins o f the American Mind, (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1987).
^®It is difficult (and incorrect) to characterize the Renaissance under one all-pervasive 
description. It was a  period lasting over three centuries — roughly the fourteenth 
through the sixteenth — characterized by a wide variety of "movements" and "schools of 
thought." The picture delineated in this paper is, due to brevity, necessarily quite 
narrow  and  reductionist.
l^David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance o f Humanism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1978). p. 5-7.
20paracelsus: Selected Writings, edited by Jolande Jacobi, 1951, quoted in J . B.
Jackson, p. 41.
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Renaissance m an was ruled not by passion or sentim ent, b u t by Reason. Logic and 
geometry were two of the primary tools of Reason: chaos and disorder were a n a t h e m a .
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were heralded as the age of 
Enlightenment. Europeans combined the wisdom of ancient Greece and Rome, 
interest in which was revived during the Renaissance, with recent advancem ents in the 
sciences and technology; in doing so they transfigured the political, social, intellectual, 
and  artistic fabric of the West. The widespread acceptance of Cartesian metaphysics 
irrevocably cleaved mind from body and reason from emotion, culture from nature and 
science from religion or magic. From a position of m anipulation on a relatively modest 
scale, the hum an  relationship to nature evolved into one of unrestrained acquisition 
and  overt dom ination over the course of the Renaissance and the Enlightnement. 
Nature, th a t part excluded from the hortus conclusus by the ever-present wall, was no 
longer simply a  backdrop for hum an activity or a foil for the civilizing influence of the 
garden interior, bu t rather the central stuff on which hum an artifice might be exercised 
and toward which hum an reason should be directed. Writing in the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, Francis Bacon, the m uch celebrated "father of modem 
science," is maligned by some for his role in establishing the fundamental paradigms 
th a t determ ine our perceptions of n a t u r e . ^3 He insisted tha t "nature exhibits herself
^W ohn Ruskin likens Renaissance knowledge to the su it of plate-arm our tha t 
constricts and inhibits the weguer. His m etaphor accurately captures one side of the 
contrasting interpretations of the character and legacy of the Renaissance. In one 
instance, the imposition of abstract Forms and Ideals on the variable, mutable 
substance of organic nature, the privileging of reason, cuid the development of a  rigid 
scientific discourse disinherits the spirit and impoverishes the material world and the 
spiritual experience thereof. In anoüier diametrically opposed reading, accurate 
observation, reason and scientific enquiry—whose subject m atter is the natural world— 
are the only m eans of freedom from the tyranny of superstition and religious dogmatism, 
and it is only through the exercise of our faculty of reason tha t we can ever hope to gain 
some insight into the workings of nature. (Ruskin, p. 262.)
22h. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 1.
23carolyn Merchant, in her book The Death o f Nature gives an accurate, if somewhat 
one-sided and limited portrayal of Bacon's contribution to m odem  science. David 
Ehrenfeld in The Arrogance o f Humanism  offers a more rounded portrait by noting that 
Bacon also reminded u s th a t "Nature is only to be commanded by obeying her" (p. 9), a 
statem ent often ignored in favor of his more aggressive ones.
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more clearly under the  trials and vexations of a rt than  when left to herself. "24 
Investigation into the secrets of nature  was no longer "interdicted or forbidden" as it was 
under the old m etaphor of "mother earth" with all its implications of incest and rape. 
Nature should be constrained, "bound into service." "molded." and m ade a  "slave" to the 
greater will of m a n k i n d . 25 It was naught b u t a  wondrous machine, a  mechanism to be 
prodded, poked, m anipulated, and subjected to the inquisition of nature 's "searchers 
and spies." (The m etaphor of nature as a  machine has proved particularly resilient — 
and damaging — over the centuries.) As an objective, independent inquisitor and 
director, ra ther than  a  dependent participant in its subject, hum anity dissociates itself 
from nature, and once separated, assum es the role of controller. We presumed, in our 
arrogance, to possess sufficient wisdom and power to m anipulate nature  for both its 
own betterm ent and th a t of m a n k i n d .  26
The task  of the scientist was to discover, through investigation and critical 
analysis, the fundam ental order of nature. The task  of the late Renaissance gardener, in 
turn , was to realize th is order on the face of the earth. As in the Medieval period, the 
land functioned as a  medium, a  text like any other text, on which to inscribe and 
append £in entire philosophical and political system. The unbounded optimism in the 
power of Reason had its practical manifestations in the landscape cuts, wherein the 
"infinite appetite" for expansion met with no perceptible "limitls] to the am ount of land 
th a t could be recovered from wilderness and from the consequences of the F a l l .  "27 To 
the  Renaissance mind straight lines and  right angles (not ordinarily found in nature)
24prancis Bacon, "De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum," (written 1623), Wbr.’cs, ed. 
Jam es Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Devon Heath, 14 vols. (London: Longmans 
Green, 1870), vol. 4, p. 298 quoted in Csuolyn Merchant, The Death o f Nature, (San 
Francisco: HarperColUns Publishers, 1980), p. 169.
26Francis Bacon, "The Great Instauration" (written in 1620), Works, vol. 4, p. 20; The 
Masculine Birth of Time," ed. and trans. Benjamin Farrington, in The Philosophy o f 
Francis Bacon (Liverpool, England: Liverpool University Press, 1964), p. 62, quoted in 
Carolyn Merchant, p. 169.
26Hugh J . Silverman, ed.. Postmodernism  — Philosophy and the Arts, (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 4.
27prest, pp. 94, 92.
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were the  m ark of intelligence, and strict adherence to the principles of regularity, 
symmetry, and uniformity were necessary to the success of any aesthetic endeavor. 
Continental gardens broke the bounds of the Medieval hortus conclusus to m arch across 
artiflcially leveled landscapes in neatly regimented, perfectly regular Euclidean 
quadrangles. The landowning aristocracy made of the "fields and meadows an open 
garden and the whole Country a  perfect Paradise.’"29 The perfectly straight, tree-lined 
avenue, w hat Prest calls "the policeman's truncheon of topography, ' was the preferred 
tool for subjugating both irrational nature  and lawless s o c i e t y . A v e n u e s  radiated 
outward from m ansion doorstep to d istan t horizon, metaphorically representing the 
power of reason stretching beyond the confines of culture to impose its structured logic 
on the world (as with Roman roads). Disorder in any part of the landscape could be 
immediately detected by the "omnipotence of the despotic gaze" of the autocrat 
inspecting his geometrically subdued domain from his d o o r s t e p . ^ l  Religious symbolism 
gave way to secular and political ideology, and the increasing m agnitude of the 
constructed, assiduously gardened spaces w as a  m easure of hum an achievement. The 
French in particular seemed to have a talent and a  passion, as well as a  suitable 
topography, for this sort of grid-like gardening, and the unrelieved geometric rigidity of 
the Sun King's gardens a t Versailles is perhaps the most perfect example of Renaissance 
rationalism .
The Renaissance predilection for geometric rationalism and simplification of 
nature, is still pervasive in the W estern mind, and hence the Western landscape. Not 
only do we organize our cities along grids, bu t our farms, our vegetable gardens, our 
yards and even the boundaries of our National Parks and Wilderness Areas are subject 
to th is passion for Euclidean rationalization. Memagement units and ownership 
boundaries are more often delineated by the surveyor's level than  by topographical
28ibid., p. 94.
29charles Evelyn, The Lady's Recreation, 1717, p. 138, quoted in Prest, p. 92. 
^9prest, p. 94.
31 Prest, 94-95.
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features, ecological processes, or habitat requirements. Of the many problems 
confronting m odem  forestry in America today, one of them  is its tendency to 
"superimpose rectangular grids of clearcuts (along with a zig-zag pattern of logging 
roads)" on visually (and ecologically) complex l a n d s c a p e s . 3 2  while we may find this sort 
of grid-organization to be appropriate, even necessary, in designing urban spaces, the 
public is no longer willing to accept it in a "natural setting," or even in a suburban  one.
Italian gardens of the Renaissance period also reflected a reawakening to 
classical ideals, b u t were different from their Continental counterparts in th a t the 
obsession with Euclidean order was tempered by the variable nature of the topography 
and  by a  renewed interest in the less constrained gardens of ancient Rome. Taking their 
cue from Pliny the Younger, the Italians extended the living space of the country villa to 
the garden by m eans of loggias and terraces, thereby taking the unprecedented step of 
situating culture in the median space carved out of nature by the gcirden. The gardens 
in the immediate vicinity of the villa were used to frame and to draw in distant vistas. 
Likened to "roofless rooms," level parterres and terraces were connected by gravel and 
stone walks often called "corridors." Business was conducted in "outdoor drawing 
rooms," theatricals performed in outdoor am phitheaters, and philosophical and political 
issues debated in outdoor "academies."^'^ Nature, as such, was not simply a  backdrop 
for hum an activity, bu t an  integrated part of daily living, ornam ented and decorated 
with sculpture and various architectural devices ju s t as the interior of a house might be. 
As an  extension of the house, the content and design of the garden were dictated by the 
sam e rules th a t governed architecture. This garden "architecture" took the organic life 
forms of trees, shrubs, grasses, water and earth  as its constituent elements in m uch the
^^Alan G. McQuillan, "Cabbages and Kings: The Ethics and Aesthetics of New Forestry," 
in Environmental Values 2 (1993), p. 205.
^^John Dixon Hunt, Garden and Grove: The Italian Renaissance Garden in the English 
Imagination, 1600-1750, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 12. Pliny the 
Younger, writing in A.D. 100-105, emphasized the inter relatedness of structure and 
place, of architecture, garden and surrounding countryside. His designs required one to 
identify and then augm ent through artifice the genius loci of a place.
^'^Loxton, p. 32.
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same way th a t stones were used in masonry walls or wood in flooring or trimming. The 
house appropriated to itself the realm of the garden; the garden in tu rn , appropriated to 
itself the landscape beyond the confines of its walls in the form of "the view."
This view consisted not of perfectly pristine nature, b u t of a  hodge podge of 
varying landscapes. The Italian countryside of the Renaissance, the result of thousands 
of years of hum an occupation, was already m uch used and heavily managed: any vista 
necessarily included cultivated fields, rural villages, d istant cities, ruins of previous 
civilizations along with m ountains, rivers, and other "natural" features. Renaissance 
villas surveyed a nature  long cultivated to meet the needs and desires of humanity, 
"poeticized" with Arcadian figures resting on tombs b u t also actively managed by farm 
workers and serviced by commercial wagons and riverboats.'"^^ The line between nature 
and culture was not always clearly delineated in the Italian Renaissance gardens as it 
was in the Continental gardens of France and Germany. Boundaries between house 
and garden, garden and nature were transgressed; not through subjecting entire 
landscapes to the monotony of Euclidean figures (thereby obliterating difference), or by 
allowing cultivated landscapes to be reclaimed by a riotous "nature," bu t through the 
deliberate inclusion of variety and diversity, through mixing m aterials and forms in order 
to create an  interesting b u t Livable landscape. The Italian's ability to integrate this 
variable landscape w ithout subduing it, to accept both the m ade and the found as part 
and parcel of the whole, is one th a t we might leam  from in designing current 
m anagem ent units.
The English Landscape Garden: art naturalized
In the  early eighteenth century English infatuation with the formal Continental 
style of gardening waned as more and more Englishmen returned from their Grand Tour 
with visions of the Italian countryside fixed in their memory. The countrysides of Greece
^^H unt, p. 37.
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and Italy exercised a  special power over the British imagination. After all, their 
education in the  classics (meaning those texts of the Greeks and Romans th a t we now  
define as "classic") and  the influence of Italian landscape painters, both worked to 
predispose the tourist to read the landscapes as they had the literature and to discover 
in it the gods and heroes as well as the groves and glades of antiquity. They returned 
home and re-envisioned their own "gentle" topography in a  distinctively English mixture 
of the pastoral and the classical in a  style th a t would come to be known as the "English 
Landscape Garden." The "new" aesthetic reconfigured, as the Continental aesthetic 
before it, the face of England. Like previous revolutions in landscape design and 
gardening, th is particular style signaled more than  a  simple evolution in landscape 
"grammar" or "syntax." Conventional ways of seeing and constructing nature in a  world 
dominated by rapidly industrializing civilizations were being re-examined. Once again, 
the landscape became the primary text on which to record reforms in the social and 
political structure. Practitioners and proponents hadled the new style as more 
"naturalistic," more in keeping with the natural "capabilities" of the land. English 
Landscape Gardening applied "no other a rt than  th a t of softening nature 's harshness 
and copying her graceful touch" such tha t "the living landscape was chastened or 
polished, [but) not transform ed."3® To them, the Landscape Garden was w hat nature 
would be if only it were capable of fulfilling its purpose, of attaining its intended 
perfection, on its own. The enduring quality of these gardens, m aintained with minimal 
effort over the last two centuries, might be considered a testam ent to the accuracy of 
th is conviction.
As in previous and successive centuries, both the literary and the plastic arts 
had  a  profound effect on cultural perceptions of nature  during the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth century, particularly in England. The romantic, idealized, 
"melodramatic" spectacles painted by artists like Claude Lorrain, Nicholas Poussin, and
^®Horace Walpole, (John Dixon Hunt, ed.) The History o f the Modem Taste in Gardening, 
(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982, (1785)), pp. 277, 266.
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Salvatore Rosa changed the way an  entire generation perceived their world, in m uch the 
sam e way th a t the nineteenth century works of Moran, Bierstadt, Cole, and  Durand 
would transform  the American landscape in the American imagination. The English in 
particular had a fondness for the Italian landscape paintings and collected the paintings 
while on their Grand Tour. In addition, an  outspoken and highly articulate group of 
"poet gardeners" publishing in England added fuel to the growing landscape 
consciousness. They spearheaded the backlash against "those crimping, diminutive and 
wretched Performcinces" —  the topiaries, knots, parterres, and terraces — of formal 
English Renaissance gardens.^^
Joseph  Addison, writing in The Spectator in 1711, accused English gardeners of 
"deviating" from nature  when gardening in the Continental style, and lamented tha t 
"our trees rise in Cones, Globes and Pyramids" and "we see the m arks of Scissors on 
every Plant and Bush."^® He evinced a wistful sentimentality for trees grown in all their 
"luxuriancy and diffusion of boughs and branches.®^ The Earl of Shaftesbury, in his 
essay The Moralists in 1710, declares a  "passion for things of a natural kind: where 
neither Art, nor the Conceit or Caprice of Man has spoiled their genuine order." He goes 
on to confess himself enamored of "even the rude Rocks, the Mossy Caverns, the 
irregular unw rought Grottos and broken Falls of Waters, with all the horrid Graves of 
the W ilderness itself," insisting th a t these represent nature with more "magnificence" 
than  the "formal Mockery of Princely G a r d e n s . A d d i s o n  supports this new cult of 
naturalistic  gardening, b u t tem pers his enthusiasm  with the admonition th a t the 
perfect garden combines both Reason and Nature. In a 1711 issue of The Spectator, he 
describes "rocks shaped into grottos covered with woodbines and jessamines" with
®^Stephen Switzer quoted in Roger Turner, Capability Brown and the E^hteenth-Century 
English Landscape, (New York: Rizzoli, 1985), p. 27. This is also a reference to shifts in 
the political and social structure  of the eighteenth century which required a  grandeur of 
garden dem eanor and aspect th a t adequately conveyed the largeness of mind and spirit 
befitting a  more "democratic" age.
®®Quoted in  Loxton, p. 65.
Joseph  Addison quoted in R. Turner, p. 45.
^^Earl of Shaftesbury, Ashley Cooper, The Moralists, 1710, quoted in Loxton, p. 65.
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"springs m ade to ru n  among pebbles" as the epitome of garden scenery, and later 
proposes th a t "if the naturéil Embroidery of the Meadows were helpt and improved by 
some small Additions of Art and the several Rows of Hedges set off by Trees . . .  a  Man 
might m ake a  pretty landskip of his own Possessions."^ ̂  Here we see the beginnings of 
an  attention to na tu re  and the natu ra l world th a t moves beyond the narrow interests of 
science and  political subjugation, into the arena of nature  as an  Eirt form and a fitting 
subject for aesthetics.
It is interesting to note tha t the "nature" eulogized and longed for by Addison. 
Pope, Shaftesbury, and others is exactly the same nature th a t in previous centuries was 
alternately excoriated and eulogized by poets, writers, philosophers, theologians, 
scientists, and gardeners. The new landscape aesthetics professed to perfect and pursue 
nature through the a rt of gardening, differing from its predecessors not only in the way 
nature  was envisioned, b u t in the final intent of gardening. Social discourse in the 
eighteenth century determined the relative value and the place of a rt and nature, of 
garden and wilderness Ju st as it had done in earlier centuries and as it does now. One 
might say th a t wilderness and civilization are as m uch m atters of social consensus as 
biophysical qualities. We create nature through an act of willful distinction and the 
illusion is perpetuated through the employment of culturally agreed upon codes, 
conventions, and signs th a t designate the realm of nature and th a t of culture. W hat 
na tu re  looks like, how it is perceived, how it is treated and where it fits into the 
cosmology are all determined by our needs and desires. The real need not change, but 
the presentation and valuation of it does.
In the process of redefining the garden, and hence nature, the English 
reconceived the Medieval terrifying wastes and impenetrable forests as "sweetly 
disordered." They "leaped the fence, and saw tha t all nature was a  gcirden" in need of 
only the sm allest b it of a rt to perfect it.'^2 This "leap" was made with the greatest of ease
Joseph  Addison, The Spectator, 1711, quoted in Loxton, p. 65. 
'^^Walpole. p. 264.
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in large part because all th rea t from "wildmen" and wildlife had  by th is time been 
effectively neutralized in the English countryside. (Much, one might say, as Muir's 
appreciation of wilderness w as m ade possible because California had  been "purged " of all 
b u t a  few of Its original inhabitants.) The Renaissance expansion of the garden from 
hortus conclusus to entire countryside m arks a  shift in consciousness regarding culture's 
"sphere of influence " and  the appropriate material of art. Eighteenth century gardens 
also spread across whole landscapes, often encom passing working farm s and tim ber 
producing forests into their d e s i g n s . U n l i k e  their Renaissance counterparts, however, 
they developed with the  express m andate to seek ou t and  enhance nature , not to 
subdue and rationalize it: let Nature never be fo rgo t... Consult the  Genius of the
Place in  all.""^ Today we m istake for " natural"' the ubiquitous, bucolic park-like 
landscapes of England; b u t those gentle undulations, sinuous lakes and  paths, endless 
meadows strewn with ungulates broken by seemingly random  clum ps of trees, are 
artificial to their very roots.^® This nature, contrary to th a t of Renaissance or Medieval 
nature, abhorred the straight line, the unwaveringly level surface, the paved walk, the 
plantation forest, clipped sh rubs and tortured trees, and vertical displays of water.
Canabilitv Brown: the place-maker 
We owe not only the transform ation of the English countryside, b u t the first 
beginnings of an  appreciation for na tu re  in the garden th a t would pave the  way for an  
appreciation for na tu re  p u î of the garden to Capability Brown (1716-1783), the  second 
and m ost prolific of the  three m ost renowned Landscape Gardeners. Though we may
"^^Loxton, p. 64. The British shipping industry  was near to exhausting their native 
supplies of tim ber, and  esta tes began turning their attention to the  cultivation of forests 
for commercial production, particularly after the 1664 publication of Jo h n  E)velyn"s 
Sybxx, or a  Discourse o f  Forest Trees.
"^Alexander Pope, O f Taste, 1731 quoted in Loxton, p. 68. Genius, here, taken  with all 
its connotations of spirit and even magic, has ra ther a  deeper and  more mystical 
m eaning th an  ju s t  the simple contours or biophysical features of a  local.
"^^Edward Hyeuns, Capability Brown and Humphrey Repton, (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 9.
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not agree w ith his readings or interpretations, "Capability" got his name because of his 
penchant for describing landscapes in term s of their "capabilities." the potential tha t lay 
dorm ant in each landscape awaiting only the touch of the artist/gardener. As such, he 
is perhaps among the first to have looked not a t w hat he could add to nature or how he 
could "decorate" or subdue it. b u t ra ther a t w hat h is art might do to realize the 
possibilities already in the landscape. His goal was good "place-making" and to th a t end 
one needed "a good plan, good execution, a  perfect knowledge of the country and the 
objects in  it, w hether na tu ra l or artificial, and infinite delicacy in the planting, etc."^® 
He is credited, and sometimes maligned, as having single-handedly obliterated virtually 
every trace of the "orthogonal" garden from the face of England and with transforming 
an  entire countryside into the quintessential "natural" l a n d s c a p e . I t  should, 
however, be noted th a t in pursuing his aesthetic ideals. Brown, Uke his predecessors, 
found it necessary to destroy nature in order to find and perfect it. His wholesale 
destruction of ancient forests and yew hedges, roadways, historic mansions, and 
intricate, formal gardens, refised a cry of protest from those whose aesthetic values 
differed from his own.^® One outspoken critic of Capability, compares Brown's version 
of landscape aesthetics to th a t of a "Norfolk girl who visited Switzerland and complained 
th a t the m ountains sh u t out the view."^® In his defense, however, it should be 
m entioned th a t unlike the immovable and timeless m ountains of Switzerland, m ost of 
the landscape on which Brown exercised his a rt had already been subjected to hum an 
occupation and cultivation.
In keeping with the aesthetics of his day. Brown's created landscapes epitomized 
"the beautiful: " they were smooth, undulating, and sinuous: varied, without being
1775 letter written by Brown, quoted in Loxton, p. 72.
^^Sir Uvedale Price, On the Picturesque with an Essay on the Origin o f Taste, (Edinburgh: 
Caldwell, Lloyd and Co., MDCCCXLII (1842)), p. 176. Price rebukes the Landscape 
G ardeners for their wholesale destruction of "the costly and magnificent decorations of 
past times, and all th a t had long been held in veneration. "
"̂ ®A less narrow  view of Brown’s work also indicates th a t he planted thousands of trees 
in a  countryside denuded by a military in search of wood for shipbuilding.
"^^Hyams, p. 25. quoting Amherst.
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abrupt or jarring: unified, w ithout being monotonously predictable: comprehensible, 
w ithout being unduly constrained: and, evocative, without being relentlessly pedantic or 
preachy. He assiduously avoided temples, urns, statuary, grottos, and other emblematic 
devices or architectural structures popular in Renaissance gardens in order to explore 
the "expressive possibilities" of pure landscape. He sought, through the creation of 
idealized spectacles using natural m aterials, to capture the essence of nature. Brown 
intentionally created landscapes th a t evoked specific feelings — of justice, virtue, or 
honor — by striving not for particulars, b u t for universal ideals: his landscapes were 
m eant to appeal to sensations, rather than  directly to the intellect, as Renaissance 
gardens had done. His faith in the evocative powers of nature, of pure landscape 
(enhanced and channeled rather th an  burdened by art), would surface again in the 
Romantic TranscendentaJists less than  a  century later.
The sensitive eye and practiced hand necessary to strike the perfect balance 
between em ptiness and fullness, to m aintain the proper tension between the found and 
the m ade was conspicuously absent in subsequent practitioners. As the eighteenth 
century drew to a  close, so did the British enthusiasm  for the classical lines of the 
Landscape Garden. The dom inant aesthetic doctrine of the nineteenth century would 
incorporate and build on many of the elements of these gardens and today traces of 
eighteenth century aesthetics are easily discernible in landscapes of Europe and 
America. V ast expanses of rolling lawns, be it in  the American front yard or the public 
park: sinuous sidewalks, driveways, and roadways: winding rivers and irregular, 
curvilinear lake shores (efforts of the corp of engineers notwithstanding): and clumped 
trees, bushes, and flowers, are all vestiges of the Brownian aesthetic. The success of 
Brown's a rt in expressing the "capabilities" of the land, in attem pting to enhance rather 
th an  transform  nature  through art. might be m easured by the degree to which we 
m istake his created landscapes for "original" nature in the English countryside. Our
50r  Turner, p. 19.
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failure to recognize these rem nant patterns as constructions or artistic products of an  
earlier era, and  our tendency to th ink of them  as natural, testifies not only to the 
enduring appeal of the  classical landscape and the skill of the landscap>er, b u t to our 
ability to be fooled by a rt th a t successfully mimics nature.
The Picturesque: w ilderness Jramed
Early nineteenth century gardening tastes favored an  emerging aesthetic known 
as the picturesque. The term was first used by Alexander Pope and was originally meant 
to describe a  scene tha t looked like the sort of landscape one might see in a  picture. The 
Reverend William Gilpin, writing after Brown's death in 1783, also described it as "that 
peculiar kind of beauty, which is agreeable in a picture" b u t adam antly meiintained that 
gardens — particularly the eighteenth century Landscape Gardens with their smooth, 
classical lines — are never picturesque for their "want of the bold roughness of 
nature. The picturesque, he believed, was impossible to create through artifice, 
available only in natu ra l scenery wherein accident had produced a happy combination 
of objects; "neither grounds laid out by art, nor improved by agriculture are of this 
kind. For Gilpin, the picturesque fell somewhere between the beautiful (as might be 
found in an  English Landscape Garden) and the sublime (as found in the "wilds ' of the 
Lake District or the Scottish Highlands), partaking of both, yet modifying and tempering 
each with principles peculiar to itself. The attributes of the picturesque include a 
d istan t view bounded by m ountains: limited wilderness, since vastness leads to 
incomprehensibility and thence to the sublime; a  foreground with "proper appendages 
proportioned to the scene;" a  scene suited to the hum an vision tha t does not strike "the 
imagination with so m uch grandeur; " a  general haziness, or indistinctness: an  absence 
of cultivated, constrained plants, since they are in all instances abhorrent to the
^^William Gilpin, E ssay Upon Prints, (London, 1768), p. 2. And William Gilpin, 
Observations on the W estern Parts o f England, Relative Chiefly to Picturesque Beauty, 
(London, 1798), p. 98.
^^Gilpin, Observations, p. ü.
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picturesque; and finally, the picturesque, as its name suggests, "invites the pencil, 
w ithout soliciting the  imagination. It can be painted by the a rtist or "found" by the 
"picturesque eye" b u t it can never be made. (Uvedale Price and Payne Knight, two of the 
m ost renowned "picturesque" gardeners of the nineteenth century, disagreed with Gilpin 
on th is point and set about rearranging the English countryside accordingly.) Oddly 
enough, these are the attributes th a t one often finds in those "scenes" recommended for 
viewing by the highway departm ent a t "Scenic Overlook" stops along interstate 
highways.
Appreciation for the aesthetic doctrine known as the picturesque, while of 
limited application in the garden, had a  profound impact on the way that people viewed 
areas traditionally considered to be outside of the realm of garden art and even beyond 
the generad aesthetic purview. Uvedale Price, one of those misguided landscape 
"improvers" who attem pted to reproduce the picturesque in the garden setting, 
nevertheless astutely predicted th a t a rt might "augment" the public appreciation of 
nature  in its rougher, less polished forms and tha t an appreciation of painted scenery 
prepared one to "better receive" the natural scenery.^'* Indeed, the nineteenth century 
would see a  trem endous upsurge in nature a rt and literature and in the migration — 
both tem porary and perm anent — of "civilized" hum ans into "untamed" nature. H ie 
picturesque, seeing natu re  as a  picture th a t was in need of no other a rt th an  that 
resident in the  eye of the beholder, constituted the grounds of our first forays into the 
land beyond the garden.
Landscape vocabulary
At th is point it is im portant to note the new language th a t was developing 
around landscape aesthetics, a  language th a t would profoundly affect our perceptions of 
and sensitivity toward "raw" nature. Seemingly unim portant in an  age when we are
53 lb id ., pp. 30,36,37,129,130. 
54ibid., p. 67.
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inundated w ith visual eind aural images of nature, these term s grew out of a culture 
th a t traditionally devalued untem pered, untouched nature. Indeed, the American 
rom ance with wilderness, its appreciation for its vast untam ed expanses, might be said 
to be predicated on a  vocabulary developed in Europe. The significance of the 
distinctions between the beautiful, the picturesque, and the sublime are often lost on us 
today. But each term  applies not only to a specific type of scenery or topography, but 
also to a  particular perception, emotion, or experience. Edmund Burke, Francis 
Hutcheson. Im m anuel Kant, and  David Hume, to nam e bu t a few, waxed eloquent on 
the subject of aesthetics and m uch of the discourse tha t developed around landscape 
gardening and  the experience of nature owes its origins to these treatises.
Both the beautiful and the picturesque have been discussed above so it remains 
to investigate the sublime and to identify its role in the construction of the world. Hie 
sublime, for Europeans, was exemplified in the ruggedness of the Swiss Alps, the harsh 
desolation of the Scottish Highlands, the impenetrable darkness of a primeval forest, a 
tem pest tossed ocean, or the wilds of the Lake District. Social convention had assigned 
a non-value to these areas; they were outside the ken of civilization and hence beyond 
the  scope of the beautiful, garden iconography, or the purview of conventional aesthetic 
preferences. The contemplation of such scenery produced feelings of insecurity and 
prompted instincts of self-preservation. The experience of the sublime is essentially 
atavistic, primal and prelinguistic, and ultimately beyond the realm of art, despite 
attem pts in a rt and literature to conjure its substance, not ju s t elicit an emotional 
response suggestive of the sublime. The Kantian formulation of the sublime is that 
which is conceivable b u t not presentable, like infinity. Any attem pt a t presentation or 
re presentation automatically m isses the mark, trivializes the concept and removes the 
sublime, the real, yet further away. Sublime landscapes defy reason, elude all attem pts
^^Art critics and theorists, however, would argue tha t the whole point of a rt is to 
pursue  the  depiction of the sublime, regardless that philosophers might deem it ein 
Impossible task.
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a t quantification, circumscription, limitation, or comprehension. They have the 
qualities th a t make them  likely candidates for W ilderness Areas and which also make 
them  unlikely recipients of management. Historically, they are the places or processes 
th a t have not yet been penetrated by the hum an mind or controlled by the hum an hand 
(or a t least no t apparently so).
Romanticism: nature deified
The ascendancy of wilderness 
The Picturesque was b u t one aspect of a  larger more pervasive aesthetic doctrine 
tha t came to be known as Romanticism, which was not simply a  landscape aesthetic, 
b u t a  way of seeing the world and of explaining our experience of it. Its origins in 
Europe ctnd its influence on the development of American thought and topography has 
been as extensive as it is enduring. Perceived as a  reaction against the classicism that 
had  dominated the philosophical, political, and social structures of Europe since the 
Renaissance, Romantics sought to re-locate themselves in their own cultural mythos 
and natu ra l landscapes, looking to them  for patterns of inspiration in re-writing their 
w o r l d . A m e r i c a n  Romantics, like Emerson and Thoreau, rejected the universalizing 
Ideals of the Greeks, which tended to favor reductionism and unity, in order to celebrate 
pluralism, variety, and difference. Where the classical model considered the "citizen" 
to be the quintessential creature of civilization, the Romantics eschewed the "mob" 
scene of democratic society and eulogized the self-relicint individual and the different. 
Emerson declared "whoso would be a  man, m ust be a nonconformist" and Thoreau 
seconded th a t statem ent with his own th a t "any m an more right th an  his neighbors 
constitutes a  majority of one."^® They Idecdized those elements of society th a t had
^®George Boas, ed.. Romanticism in Am erica  (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), p. vi- 
ix.
^^Ibid., pp. V i ,  14.
®®Ibid., pp. 2, 3. It should be noted tha t Emerson qualified his support of individualism 
by indicating th a t an individual was nothing if he was not also a member of "the 
brotherhood of God-Illumined men."
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previously been margin£ilized: children, women, fools, nature, and animals. Men were 
encouraged to seek ou t and cultivate their "lupine" natu re  buried beneath layers of 
cultural inhibitions and learned behaviors.
Roderick Nash in his classic text. W ilderness and the American Mind, chronicles 
the American experience and creation of Wilderness. According to him, American 
Romantics, expressed a preference for the "strange, remote, solitary, and mysterious" the 
true  version of which was available only in nature  or wilderness.®® WÜd nature was the 
origin of scientific knowledge (as it had been for the Renaissance and the Greeks), bu t 
for the Romantic Transcendentalists in particular, it was also the source of higher 
tru th s  and moral laws. Nature for them  was the last remaining outpost of undefiled, 
unpolluted Creation, and it was only in wilderness th a t one might experience the 
presence of God.®^ Transcendentalists urged an experience and interpretation of the 
world th a t ascribed a  spiritual tru th  or element to material things, th a t went beyond 
mere appearances to seek the higher tru th s or essences embodied in these 
phenomena.®2 Objective, scientific inquiry was invaluable in leading the observer into a 
deeper appreciation of the intricacies of the natural world, an  appreciation which 
should, in tu rn , dispose the sensitive observer to exercise his intuition in discovering the 
higher spiritual values in nature. It might be said th a t to the Romantics we owe our 
W ildemess ethic and sensibility, b u t to the Transcendentalists we owe our attribution of 
an  elevated moral or spiritual character to things of nature rather than  those of culture.
W ildemess, interestingly enough, was rehabilitated (even constructed) in the 
salons of Europe and the drawing rooms of Eastern seaboard cities, the inhabitants of 
whom had b u t limited casual contact with its unm ediated, unsentim ental, and
®®Boas, viii-xi. George Boas suggests th a t it is to the Romantics that we owe our 
kindness to children and fondness for pets, our fascination with primitive m an and our 
love of nature.
®®Roderick Nash, W ildem ess and the American Mind, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1967), p. 47.
®^Ibid., Chapters 3 and 5 in particular.
®^Ibid., p. 85.
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indifferent w i l d n e s s . T h e  literati flocked to nature, spent a  few days or weeks being 
transported and transfigured by her glories and returned home to spew forth a  "deluge of 
Romantic euphoria" detailing the wisdom and superiority of virgin n a t u r e . ^  
gentleman, if he desired to be considered a t all cultured, m ust have a sensitivity to and 
passion for all things natu ra l and wild. He m ust be cognizant of the higher spiritual 
aspects of na tu re  and  able to dem onstrate an  adequate knowledge of her workings 
based perhaps on some personal transcendental, experience thereof. Nature, formerly "a 
Squalid, horrid, . . . D ese rt. . . over filled with Fiery flying serpents," was transformed by 
the Romantics into the purveyor of all th a t was good and right and divine. The man 
who sought to be truly civilized, m ust know the course of nature  as he once knew th a t 
of culture.
The English Romantics, precursors to their American Transcendental 
counterparts, took to their own hinterlands in search of the sublimity and majesty of 
the wildemess. The desolate w astes of the Lake District and the Highlands of Scotland 
underw ent a radical metam orphosis with the aid of poet’s pen and artist's brush. Lord 
Byron, in a  spate of romeintic passion for the wildemess penned his confessions in 1816 
in  which he proclaims:
There is a pleasure in the pathless woods.
There is a  rapture on the lonely shore.
There is society where none intrudes
I love not m an less, bu t nature more.®®
Keats and  Shelley, Wordsworth, Blake, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge rehabilitated the 
whole of the English countryside with their powerful, persuasive sentim ental verse. 
Nature yielded knowledge, b u t the higher tru th s valued by the literati were said to be
®^Ibid., p. 60.
®4ibid., p. 62.
®®Gerald D. Nash, Creating the W est Historical Interpretations JS90-1990, (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1991), p. 205.
®®Lord Byron’s "1816 confession," quoted in R. Nash, p. 50
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available only to those of tender sentiments.®^ Only the cultivated and educated could 
truly appreciate the spiritual wonders of wildem ess w ithout succumbing to her 
seductive savagery and brutality as so many of the frontiersmen and peasant class did. 
Her company was preferable to th a t of society, her wisdom of greater value than  any 
derived from civilization. Very few of the English, European, or Eastern seaboard literati 
who so praised wild nature  actually experienced it for any length of time (and certainly 
none of them  had to make their living from it); m ost of the European landscape, in the 
words of one of its inhabitants, was b u t a "cultivated plain" and there was not m uch in 
the way of w ildem ess left on the east coast.®® Such a  lack, however, did not prevent 
them  from developing the conceptual and aesthetic framework necessary for appreciating 
these "Inhuman" landscapes and familiarity with these conventions enabled the 
"aristocratic sightseer" to "wrest an  aesthetic pleasure" from the Great Wildemess.®®
The extreme appreciation accorded the sublime and the picturesque, the habit of seeing 
natu re  as something "out there" was an  aristocratic luxury, similar to the one tha t we 
in America and other affluent societies enjoy today. Social critics of the nineteenth 
century like Jo h n  Ruskin accused the aristocracy of indulging themselves in an 
aesthetic excess predicated on a willful ignorance of and indifference to the misery of the 
inhabitan ts of th a t "nature" who were forced to wrest a living from it rather than  an 
innocuous aesthetic pleasure.^®
Romanticism in America was somewhat less willfully Ignorant of the toils of 
everyday life; for in a country whose largest constituent land m ass was raw wildemess 
and the bulk  of whose population was engaged in an all out war with nature on its 
considerable frontier, some of the more real characteristics of the unm ediated Great 
W ildemess were inevitably reflected in the literature and philosophy. Untempered
®^R. Nash, p. 60.
®®François René de C hateaubriand quoted in R. Nash, p. 49.
®®Michael Waters, The Garden in Victorian Literature, Aldershot, GB: Scholar Press, 
1988), p. 154.
70ibid. p. 155.
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Romanticism was generally unheard  of, or a t least short-lived, and even some of the 
more arden t en thusiasts succum bed to terror and despair in m oments of unmediated 
confrontation with na tu re 's  more sublime displays. Both Emerson and Thoreau 
conceded the  desirability of some civilizing restraint and the necessity of finding a 
balance of culture and natu re  — a  foot in both camps, rather than  both feet planted 
firmly in the pastoral, ruralized middle."^^ Thoreau, on a hike in the "grim" wildemess of 
Maine, gives way to an uncharacteristic spate of despair a t the sight of the "savage and 
dreeuy" landscape. He calls it "a place for heathenism  and superstitious rites — to be 
inhabited by m en nearer of kin to the rocks and wild anim als than  we."^^
B ut the American fascination with wild nature did not wane and the idea of 
w ildem ess achieved the s ta tu s  of a  national icon. The vast wildem ess was a  quality 
unique to the  North American continent and the only attribute around which a  rising 
sense of nationalism  might rally. Consciousness of the value of wildemess, as an 
icon of a  national identity, was fostered by the literary and plastic arts. The landscapes 
of Moran, Bierstadt, Cole, and Durand (most of whom were European) fired the 
im aginations of thousands of urban-bound eastem ers. Jo h n  Muir, (the only self- 
proclaimed "poetico-trampo-geologist-bot. and om ith-natural, etc!-!-!-!" Romantic who 
did not succum b to the temporizing blandishm ents of a  toned down nature), detailed for 
an  avid public the unqualified wonders of nature. His passion for nature led him to 
fight tirelessly for the preservation of the American wildemess and th is he did by 
enlisting the aid of Biblical scripture. He characterized the battle as one "between 
landscape righteousness and  the Devil" and in a particularly eloquent segment, he 
insists th a t "God began the reservation system in Eden " and "the whole (American) 
continent w as a  garden...[which] from the beginning...seemed to be favored above all the
^1r . Nash, pp. 92-3.
^^H. D. Thoreau, Maine Woods, Writings, quoted in R  Nash, p. 91. 
73r. Nash, p. 67.
74ibid.. p. 122.
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other wild parks and  gardens of the g l o b e .  "^5 Unfortunately for us, Muir's 
characterization of the whole of North America as a  "garden " or "park" did not 
autom atically lead u s  to then  adopt the attitude of a  gardener, or even an engaged 
participant, in nature 's splendors. Contrarily, we found ourselves and all our works 
once again banished from the garden, bu t th is time to the "wildemess " and chaos of 
civilization.
The fall of the garden
Nineteenth centuiy  landscape aesthetics moved out of the garden into the wider 
world of untouched and pristine nature where the presence and works of hum anity were 
generally considered antithetical.^® Indeed, the cultivated garden, along with the whole 
practice of gardening, fell into disfavor as more and more people became enamored of the 
idea of "virgin nature." Even a  garden simulation of nature was no longer acceptable to 
the pu rist who extolled the virtues of nature  against the vices of civilization, of which 
cultivation was one. The Romantic notions of the literati pu t hum ans in an  untenable 
position: to be pure and real, nature w as to rem ain untouched by humanity; to survive, 
hum anity m ust influence the environment, an activity which immediately rendered it — 
to the pu rist — unnatural. When creating and tending to his bean field a t Walden, 
Thoreau is confronted with the veiy pragmatic, unrom antic task  of making "invidious 
distinctions " between natu re 's  p lants and m an 's "weeds," between the natural 
proclivities of woodchucks and his own need for sustenance, It throws him into a  fit 
of irresolution and angst, he needs his beans to survive, bu t to cultivate them  m eans
75g . Nash, p. 207.
^®Gardening did not cease, naturally, b u t our attentions were divided between the 
garden interior and the larger world beyond the city limits. One element of the 
picturesque th a t some Romantic traditions continued to value was the passion for 
things like ru ins and herm its. Romanticism is not homogeneous, and hence any effort 
a t brief description (such as this) is bound to be unfairly reductionist. I merely try to 
point up  some of the more pervasive tendencies and attitudes th a t have had lasting 
effects on our notions of "nature" and "culture. "
^^Henry D. Thoreau, Walden, (New York: Bam es and Noble, 1992), pp. 133, 137.
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th a t he m u st do so a t the cost of other na tu ra l features. In our new-found fascination 
with w ildem ess, the garden was consigned to the narrow confines it occupies today; 
naugh t b u t a  tepid version of nature found in hemmed-in backyards and city parks, too 
refined and constrained to embody the ennobling aspects of the rough and rugged 
wildemess. We no longer had a  sense of engaging with nature, of discovering and then 
enhancing its capabilities through the activity of gardening, bu t rather were forced to 
choose between submissive reverence and overt, complete domination, both of which 
tended to exclude ra ther th an  include hum anity. Nature had attained the sta tu s of a 
heightened desire, it represented all th a t was not-culture, not by virtue of absence, bu t 
by virtue of presence. The garden was no longer a  bridge between nature and culture, a  
space in which we might carefully and considerately design the world, bu t a feeble, 
transparen t sim ulation th a t failed to meet the needs of those interested only in the real 
thing.
Normalization and socialization
At the same time th a t Muir was fighting to preserve the great O them ess of 
wildemess, another more tempered version of nature appreciation was occurring in 
social circles. Middle and  late nineteenth century aesthetic doctrine was an amalgam of 
rom anticism  and naturalism . Nature in all its splendor was "the rage;"; it was the 
m easure of all th a t was "good" from etiquette and comportment to political, moral, and 
social organization.^® If it was "natural" it was good, and to be good, it m ust be 
natural. Nature became to th is era w hat religion had been to earlier ages.^^ The 
paintings of Gainsborough and Constable returned the long- absent laborer 
(dispossessed by aristocratic aesthetic sensibilities) once more to the landscape, and in 
doing so conceptually restored the common m an to nature. From the exclusive province
^®Anne Bermingham, Landscape and Ideology: The English Rustic Tradition 1740-1860, 
(Berkeley: University of CaUfomia, 1986), p. 25.
Ju liu s  Gy. Fabos, et al., Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr.: Founder o f Landscapes in 
America, (University of M assachusetts Press, 1968) p. 12.
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of aristocrats and artists, access to nature as a  medium for pleasure, restoration, and 
respite, became the right of eveiy last citizen of any enlightened society. Nature became 
the locus of values, th a t paradoxically, were, in fact, socially determined. In some sense, 
it assum ed a  social identity and with it. a  correspondent social obligation. It was put 
into the  service of society to function as a  balm for u rban  discontent and social or 
industrial ills.
Frederick Law Olmsted: the urban park goes native
By the middle of the nineteenth century the Industrial Revolution was well 
underway, and urbanization, with its complement of rural depopulation, p u t 
trem endous pressure on the resources of urban  centers. Cities were filled with wealthy 
m anufacturers, laborers, freed slaves, and the unemployed. Urban sprawl went 
unchecked eind unplanned. Urban space was a t a  premium, too valuable to leave 
unused  and too scarce to leave open. But there was a  counter-consciousness in society 
th a t recognized the necessity of m aintaining some sort of open space, of nature if you 
will, in the  cityscape and the concept of the public park was bom . Social philosophers 
and natu ra lists made clear the connections between the m ental and physiced well being 
of laborers and  the quality of their environments: if industrialists wanted increased 
production, a  suitable environment was necessary to ensure the health, and th u s 
productivity of the working force. Nature as "environment" came into being during this 
time and landscape was no longer the province of the wealthy to be artistically arranged 
for viewing pleasure, b u t ra ther a  component part of the health  of the average urban 
dweller.
Frederick Law Olmsted was heralded as America's first native bom  and most 
visionary landscape architect. The title of landscape architect, however, is almost too 
narrow  to describe Olmsted's array of interests and accomplishments. He was what we 
might today call a  "comprehensive environmental planner cind designer," a creator of
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landscapes who looked not only to "nature" for his designs, b u t also to the needs and 
desires of the  city bound masses.®^ In his landscapes, many or m ost of which were 
designed in limited public spaces surrounded by buildings, he sought to embody those 
perceptions of na tu re  th a t might best speak to the u rban  dweller, easing the pressures of 
a  life narrowly bounded by civilization. To Olmsted's cleair vision, we owe not only the 
existence of New York's Central Park and Boston's interconnected park  system, bu t 
Yosemite and a  m ultitude of other public and private landscapes.
Olmsted had  no formal training as a  landscape architect, b u t his sense of the 
land, of its "capabilities." combined with an accurate sense of social space, enabled him 
to create parks and communities th a t were a t once ecologically and socially viable. On 
his first visit to England, he toured the "People's Park " in Birkenhead, the first public 
park in England, which provided him with the prototype and the im petus for his parks 
in American cities.®^ He moved the arena of social reform into the province of the 
garden, so to speak, in keeping with his firm belief th a t nature — be it found or made — 
was the only antidote to the dehumanizing influence of an industrializing culture. Like 
Capability Brown, and in contrast to the Romantics, the design of nature in Olmsted’s 
public parks involved trem endous m anipulation of the topography and vegetation. The 
pastoral meadows, scenic vistas, rock outcroppings, rolling hills, and multiple-pond 
w ater works of New York's Central Park entailed the rearrangem ent of 5 million cubic 
yards of dirt and rock and 114 mUes of underground drainage pipes. ®2 Despite the 
m onum ental earthworks, Olmsted had a unique ability to perceive in the land untapped 
possibilities and  to write the  landscape into an  evocative text tha t spoke more of nature 
than  of his artifice. His m andated preference for natural features, however, did not 
prevent him  from designing "human-friendly" landscapes. The lakes were designed for
®®Albert Fein, Frederick Law Olmsted and the American Landscape Tradition, (New York: 
George Brazüler, 1972), p. 3.
Birkenhead was designed by Joseph Paxton in 1844. Laura Roper, FLO: A Biography 
o f Frederick Law Olmsted. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p.
71.
G^Fabos, p. 20.
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winter ice-skating, meadows for picnicking and relaxing, and paths for ease of passage 
and sightseeing. The u rban  public park was m eant to serve those trapped in the city by 
suggesting to the "imagination...an unlimited range of ru ral conditions" and Olmsted 
w as not squeam ish about m anipulating the organic elements to achieve the desired 
end.®^
Olmsted did not stop with the design of urban  parks, suburban  neighborhoods, 
private estates, and open spaces. While in California managing the Mariposa Mining 
Estate in 1863, Olmsted made his personal discovery of the American west. Accustomed 
to the lu sh  greenery and pastoral vistas of his native New England, he initially found the 
landscapes of the arid west to be harsh  and inhospitable. But with time and his innate 
sensitivity to natural aesthetics, he came to treasure these sublime landscapes and set 
about the task  of getting large tracts of "pristine" lands protected for future generations. 
Recognizing the need for "the establishm ent by government of great public grounds" for 
the "recreation of the mind and body" of the "great body of the people." Olmsted 
supervised the preparation of the bill th a t made Yosemite Valley and Mariposa Big Tree 
Grove into sta te  reservations.®'^ The establishm ent of Yellowstone National Park in 
1879 and the restoration of the already over-developed natural beauty of Niagara Falls 
owe m uch to Olmsted's work in California on behalf of public open spaces.®^
From the landscape gardens and public parks of Great Britain, to the urban 
parks of New York and Boston, from thence to sta te  reserves and finally National Parks, 
Olmsted’s understanding of the land and the peculiar needs of urban-bound hum ans 
left an  indelible m ark on the  American landscape and mind. He. unlike m any of his 
successors, had the unique ability to recognize th a t the needs of socially circumscribed 
hum ans might be m et not ju s t  in wild settings, bu t in artificially contrived settings that 
successfully mimicked nature. By putting art in the service of nature as well as of
®^Elizabeth Barlow, Frederick Law Olmsted's New York, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1972), p. 21; and Fein, p. 22.
®^Roper, p. 284.
®^Fabos, p. 43.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
culture, he neither hum anized the landscape nor dehum anized the social milieu: 
instead, he explicitly acknowledged the need and desire of hum ans to participate in the 
na tu ra l world.
Olmsted, a s both a  social reformer and a  proponent of nature preservation, 
moved easily between the increasingly discreet spheres of culture and nature. He was 
able to envision a  broad spectrum  of landscapes, participating to varying degrees in 
elements of nature  and those of culture. On the verge of the  twentieth century, when 
scientific resource m anagem ent or conservation, wilderness preservation or "landscape 
righteousness," and  gardening or landscape architecture would become irrevocably split, 
Olmsted was perhaps one of the last influential individuals to move freely between all 
three areas. He combined aesthetics with practical necessity in working to preserve 
nature where he found it, improve or alter it where desirable, and recreate it entirely 
where it was lacking or irreparably degraded. As a one-time farmer, he was cognizant of 
the "real" limits to hum an desires with respect to nature and the need for efficient 
cultivation in an  age of m achines and increasing urbem populations. As a social 
reformer, he was especially sensitive to the hum an need for some semblance of nature, 
no m atter how "artificially" constructed. As an older contemporaiy of Gifford Pinchot 
and  a  sometime colleague when working on the Biltmore estate and its industrial 
forests, he was not unaw are of the increasing need for m anagem ent and conservation of 
resources. And finally, as an  a rtist with a  keen sense of fitness and landscape 
aesthetics, he had  a knack for "place-making" th a t took account of the multiplicity of 
hum an experiences of nature.
Gifford Pinchot: the  M anagement of Nature
The federal forest reserve system instituted by the utilitarian-minded Gifford 
Pinchot, w as inspired primarily by the need to ensure a  continuous supply of raw 
m aterials for a growing nation. Pinchot, ever the pragm atist, approached nature from a
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conservationist perspective and  he devoted as m uch time to campaigning against the 
preservationist's agenda to "lock up" vast tracts of land as he did to fighting the 
"American Colossus . . . in tent on appropriating and exploiting the riches of the richest 
of all continents — grasping with both hands, reaping where he had not sown, wasting 
w hat he thought would last forever."®® As America's first native-born professional, 
scientifically-trciined forester, he harbored no sentim ental or romantic notions about 
nature; for him, it was a  vast, b u t not inexhaustible, storehouse of raw m aterials to be 
scientifically managed for the use of present eind future generations.
Pinchot was the first to suggest th a t the federal government might manage 
nature so as to produce specific products or resources, not ju s t  set aside tracts "for the 
free enjoyment of the AmeriCcin people " as  Olmsted had suggested. For all its perceived 
failings and narrow -m indedness in the current era, Gifford Pinchot's idea of managing 
nature  to ensure "that one crop follows another" (much like a  vegetable garden) was 
m uch needed and remarkably farsighted for its time.®^ Unlike many of his 
contemporaries, Pinchot understood th a t there were limits to the abuse the land could 
withstand.®® But like others of his era, he tended to view forests as giant timber 
producing m achines that, if kept in good working order, could be expected to continue 
producing goods and services in perpetuity. The goal was to "make the forest produce 
the largest possible am ount of whatever crop or service will be m ost useful, and keep on 
producing it for generation after generation of men and trees."®® Timber was the 
primary product of good forestry, b u t as with good farming, a host of otlier secondary 
products and  services could be expected from the "well-handled" forest such as 
"regulation of stream  flow, protection against erosion, and some influence on 
climate.'"®® For him, it was not a  m atter of stopping the ax, b u t of regulating its use.®l
®®Gifford Pinchot, B reakir^ New Ground, (New York: HBJ, 1947), p. 23. 
®7ibid., p. 31.
®®Ibid., p. 27.
8®Ibid., p. 32.
®Olbid., p. 31.
®llbid., p. 29.
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To th a t end, he advocated the implementation of scientific forest m anagem ent in 
conjunction w ith government regulation in order to ensure th a t the productivity of the 
land w as no t destroyed along with the harvest. Sceneiy, needless to say, was simply not 
a  consideration.
The ethic of efBciency th a t fueled the progressive era, and hence the conservation 
movement, has had a  profound effect on the missions and m ethods of the agency 
charged w ith adm inistering national forests and public lands — not to mention some 
very distinctive patterns left on the landscape. Conservation was a  "political system 
guided by the ideal of efficiency and dominated by the technicians who could best 
determine how to achieve it."®^ Increasingly, the character of the American landscape 
bore testam ent to th a t ethic along with the scientific expertise of aesthetically 
impoverished technicians. Foresters, following Pinchot’s  maxim th a t "forestiy is Tree 
Farming...[and] to grow trees as a crop is Forestry," had visions of growing "timber" like a 
vegetable gardener would cabbages or a farmer a  crop of com: in rectilinear patches of 
neat, well-regulated rows of even-aged, single-specied, and deformity-fi-ee trees. 
Alternative uses, needs, and desires which might have led to different landscape 
patterns, have, especially since WWII. been subordinated to the overriding goal of timber 
production. In our ignorance, and one might argue our arrogance, we converted 
complex ecosystems to mono cultures for ease of production and harvest, without 
realizing th a t successful tim ber production was in m any instances dependent upon the 
very complexity that we tried to eradicate. The effect on the aesthetic sensibilities was 
disturbing to many, b u t the effect on the environment was often devastating.
Over the  ensuing decades, private and some public forests and landscapes have 
come to resemble the overly formal, militantly regimented, and elaborately contrived 
gardens of the  Renaissance ra ther than  the integrated gardens of eighteenth century
^^It is no accident that, given Pinchot's perceptions of forests as "crops," the Forest 
Service is p a rt of the United S tates Departm ent of Agriculture.
^^Samuel P. Hays. Conservation and the Gospel ojEJfidency, quoted in Knight and Bates, 
p. 37.
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English landscapers. It is not so m uch th a t they have literal knots, parterres, and 
topiaries, b u t th a t they lack the variety, complexity, and fluidity of a  landscape devoted 
to producing and sustaining a  variety of purposes and values. At one scale of resolution 
(as when standing in the m idst of one) tree farms are monotonous, predictable, and 
fairly uninteresting. At a  larger scale (as from a  plane, a satellite, or even ju s t  a  view 
from town, for example) the resemblance of vast landscapes to Renaissance gardens is 
sometimes uncanny: the unrelieved geometry of checkerboard patterns created by 
varying ownership and use classifications (National Parks and  National Forests, cities 
and farms, private tim ber companies and public forest holdings, clearcuts eind leave 
stands criss-crossed by roads) looks alot like the rectilinear segments dissected by 
radiating pa ths and roadways of the formal landscapes favored by Renaissance (and 
modernist) designers. The single minded commitment to the Renaissance notion of land 
rationalization, use-classification, and segregation of modem, scientific land 
management, has been undeniably succesful and useful in m any respects. But it largely 
ignores a  millennium of gardening wisdom and two whole centuries of landscape design 
in which a prim ary attention to aesthetics did not preclude the production of 
commodities. It was the preference of the age, not the dictates of some immutable law of 
na tu re  (or culture, for th a t matter) th a t prompted us to privilege the vegetable garden 
with its straight, uniform lines of single-specie plants over the flower garden with its 
often random  conglomeration of variable species th a t have no other apparent value 
th an  the pleasure of the gardener and viewer. Conservation's penchant for timber over 
trees, science over art, and  the aesthetics of efficiency over those of participation have 
taken their toll on large portions of the American landscape as well the public’s 
patience.
Pinchot was not wrong to fight for conservation, to insist th a t both science and 
governm ent regulation be applied to the growth and harvest of trees, nor to believe th a t 
forests existed for the primary use and benefit of hum an kind. To the single-minded
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vision of Pinchot we owe the existence of large trac ts of publicly owned forested 
landscapes th a t preserve and protect a diversity of na tu ra l and cultural values. Without 
his fore sight, m uch of w hat is now public domain would have long ago passed into 
private ownership. His error, it seems to me, is in privileging science and single-use 
forestry to the exclusion of all else, a s if to say th a t there is no other legitimate way of 
relating to na tu re  and  no other (certainly no higher) value to forests than  as board-feet 
traded on the m arket. His intransigent opposition to wilderness preservation, along 
with his stated preference for technical expertise over aesthetic engagement set a  course 
for resource m anagem ent th a t would, over the next century, produce environmental, 
economic, and  political conflicts.
Conclusion
I stop here, a t the opening of the twentieth century, not because our perceptions 
and constructions of na tu re  ceased to evolve, b u t because the schism  between the arts 
and sciences, between rom antic transcendentalism  and "stoic utilitarianism," between 
preservation and conservation, is now firmly established.^'^ The gulf between these 
seemingly disparate interests and perspectives widened over the decades since Muir and 
Pinchot staked out the positions, leading finally to an  impasse in resource management 
th a t would have u s  believe there are bu t two choices available to u s in our interactions 
with nature: leave it entirely alone or tu rn  it all into neatly-regimented tree farms. The 
middle road, th a t of gardening (on a grand scale th a t elicits the full participation of the 
gardener in the things of nature, not ju s t  the m echanical production of crops of 
vegetables) h as now begun to re-emerge as a distinct alternative to seeing things only in 
black and  white. W hat to do with wildlands — constrained, surrounded, and 
fragmented as they are — and how m uch of it to do, is indeed a  serious question, one 
th a t is be tter served by encouraging and sustaining the discourse on landscape
^^The term  "stoic utilitarianism" comes from Alan McQuillan's Cabbages paper, p. 191.
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m anagem ent th an  by offering up  quick, simplistic, and irrevocable answers. But for the 
vast majority of the spaces th a t are already "compromised, " already "cultivated" by our 
activities and  our words, we might do well to consider the possibility of gardening them 
with an  eye both  to the aesthetics of utility and those of pleasure.
G ardens cem be "managed" to yield a  wide variety of products and services: food 
(vegetable and  animal), game, medicinals, timber, trees, aesthetic amenities, recreation, 
and respite from the rigors of civilization. They have been and can be hunting preserves, 
botanical showcases, tree farms, settings for architectural structures, outdoor theaters, 
working farm s and rgmches, and wilderness areas all rolled into one. They can be fully 
integrated landscapes in which elements devoted to utilitarian production are 
incorporated into a  landscape plan based on both a rt and science. Depending on the 
intended uses or desired products, the design and m aintenance of a  garden (a yard, a  
public park, a  National Park, a  National Forest, or a  Wilderness Area) requires more or 
less effort on the part of its "keepers" or stewards. That it requires some effort always is 
alm ost certain in present day society where increasing fragmentation and simplification 
have altered m any ecosystem structures and processes. But why go into forestry, or any 
other ecological discipline, if not with the intent "to p u t one's fingers in the dirt," to 
actively engage with na tu re  a t an  intim ate level?
Despite the fact th a t a  century of activity would suggest otherwise, there is 
nothing inherent in forestry tha t prevents a  forester from seeing trees as well as board 
feet, from seeing whole fo rests  as landscapes as well as management units, or from 
talking about a rt in the sam e breath  as science: they are each possessed of their own 
peculiar aesthetics and have their own appropriate uses. The eclectic nature of 
postm odernism  suggests tha t there is room for both vegetable gardens and flower 
gardens, for tree-plantations and wilderness areas, and for a  multiplicity of interim 
sta tes in our constructions of the world, with each "state of nature" providing a
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different level of engagement on the part of the gardener in its construction and 
m aintenance.
From the kitchen gardens of Medieval feudalism to the hortus conclusus of the 
Church, from the political gardens of m onarchs to the landscape gardens of English 
aristocracy, from public park  to state parks, recreation areas, Nationcil Forests, National 
Parks, and  W ilderness areas, civilization is in pursu it of an  elusive, essential, nature. 
Tracing the history of garden architecture, of the construction of space and of ways of 
seeing and  explaining our experience In the world elucidates the variable character of 
"nature" and  the ambiguity of our relationship with it. We hold th a t there is nothing 
essential in nature; it is art, a  product of our collective consciousness, subject to the 
vagaries and vicissitudes of socially sanctioned conventions, (And if there is an  elusive 
essence in nature, it lies, by definition, in the "real", and is thus, necessarily beyond the 
symbolic, impossible to find and express a t the level of our conscious, linguistic, social 
being.®^) Gardens, as texts in progress, record this ever-changing consciousness and 
provide u s  the opportunity to participate in w hat might otherwise be an impersonal and 
d istan t world.
As gardeners, both literal and figurative, we are the imperfect architects of our 
world. The limitations of our sensory and cognitive "apparati" preclude our ever 
achieving a comprehensive understanding of our environment. B ut we are not without 
the ability to leam  from our m istakes and to act on the basis of new knowledge. The 
character and  ultim ate "survival" of ourselves and our world is predicated on our ability 
to get beyond outdated models and representations, to transgress self-imposed 
limitations th a t prevent u s  from fully engaging in the creative aspects of our own 
natures. Between the limits of our knowledge and the real there is an irreducible gap, 
the Uminal zone, in which the possibility of creative existence, in the form of gardening 
one might say, is exercised.
^^Alan McQuillan, pers. comm. (September 5, 1995).
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CONCLUSION
THE LIMINAL ZONES:
PLACE-MAKING BETWEEN THE WILD AND THE TAME
Conventional wisdom has it th a t the arts and sciences are different beasts; they 
share no common ground, no common interests, and no common language. The 
preceding chapters suggest th a t in contemporary thought and practice, this myth is less 
true th an  ever. The discourse known as postm odern deconstruction in the hum anities 
and th a t known as ecosystem m anagem ent in some areas of applied science represent 
parallel developments of similar world views in seemingly disparate areas of interest. 
Chapter Two explicated postm odern deconstruction theory and discussed its 
implications for how we conceptually construct and relate to nature. It also spoke to 
the misgivings of some in the scientific community who view postmodernism as a  threat 
to any benign approach to nature. Chapter Three examined how ecosystem 
m anagem ent, like postm odern deconstruction, advocates an  entirely new approach to 
nature, culture, and  m anagem ent, ultimately repositioning hum ans in the natural 
landscape and nature  in the cultural landscape. Chapter Four investigated the course 
of the cultural evolution of "nature" through the history of gardening and suggested 
th a t in seeking models upon which to reconceive its m anagem ent activities, ecosystem 
m anagem ent might look to gardening and gardeners.
To recap, some in the environmental sciences fear th a t postmodernism discounts
the very reality of nature by reducing it to naught bu t a  figment of social discourse, and
in doing so weakens argum ents for environmental protection. It was suggested in
C hapter Two th a t postm odernists do not reject reality, b u t rather qualify all of our
constructions of it along with the values th a t we append to those constructions. Though
it does indeed rob "essentialists" of their argum ents by removing the possibility of an
appeal to authentic, original nature, postm odern deconstruction does not nullify their
desires, ju s t  their premises. In fact, it strengthens their argum ents by lending them an
101
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equality with all other constructions and desires; m eaning and value are created, not 
found, and  th is  act of creation is equally available to all. Postmodern deconstruction 
supports the interactive, creative perspectives and activities of new fields like restoration 
ecology and ecosystem management: not because these are the only ways of relating to 
nature, b u t because they represent possible ways of doing so. Postmodernism does not 
nullify traditional desires for preservation or conservation, it simply broadens the scope 
so as to include a wider variety of interpretations, th u s opening the door for increased 
participation and engouem ent with (not total control of) na tu re  — a  position th a t 
hum ans have too long denied themselves. Postmodernism ceases to privilege any one 
approach or perspective, and in doing so reinvents nature in a m anner tha t makes it 
more approachable by the average hum an: it can now be the locus of scientific 
knowledge, spiritual wisdom, m ental stability, or physical well-being; it can be defined 
and designed as m uch by desires as science, as m uch by society as biophysical necessity. 
At bottom, deconstruction offers u s  carte blanche with respect to how we Interact with 
the environm ent — som ething we have had all along — b u t unlike traditional 
approaches th a t allow u s an  appeal to God or Nature or Science — and hence 
convenient scapegoats for our m istakes — it situates responsibility for actions taken or 
not taken squarely in our midst.
Ecosystem m anagem ent developed unknowingly out of the pervasive milieu of 
postm odern deconstruction — th a t is. a  general sense of dissatisfaction with the 
patterns left on the landscape, the disregard for values other them those th a t fell within 
the realm of science or th a t could be m easured and traded on the m arket economy, and 
the sense th a t there m ust be some other way of doing things in spite of appeirent 
evidence to the contrary. Reconceiving of nature as an  ecosystem, th a t is. as a holistic 
system in which all parts and processes (including those of hum ans) are irrevocably 
interconnected, the interactions of which are impossible to predict with any assurance, 
represented a  gesta lt shift in the perception and construction of the world. Management
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
prescriptions and practices m ust perforce change to accommodate th is less positivist, 
more fluid construction. The very real presence of ignorance is given full due in 
m anagem ent strategies, a s  is the contingency of knowledge and the constant variability 
of hum an desires; hence, adaptability is essential in developing not only viable 
m anagem ent strategies, b u t in designing sustainable landscapes. Hum ans and our 
myriad activities are once more restored to the earth, not as dom inators or disinterested 
observers, b u t as dependent, fully engaged inhabitants. Perhaps the greatest 
achievement of ecosystem m anagem ent to date is its recognition th a t the places it 
proposes to m anage are, in the final analysis, highly intim ate "home places" invested 
with the desires of a wide variety of inhabitants, with histories and futures, not ju s t 
impersonal, unchanging "management units" to be administered by technicians and 
bureaucrats for the production of commodities or the "protection" of environments. 
Ecosystem m anagem ent is about "place-making," about combining th e ^ u n d  with the 
made in dynamic cultural and natural landscapes: its success, finally, is predicated on 
its ability to consult or invoke the "Genius of the Place" in all its endeavors.
The philosophical and operational position assum ed by ecosystem management 
closely resembles tha t of gardening: for gardening, like land management, is the 
realization of philosophical, political, social, aesthetic, economic, and scientific 
positions on the biophysical landscape. Gardening is an  exercise in constructing nature 
as well as culture. The activities undertaken in either endeavor give tangible answer to 
questions about the "proper place" of hum ans in nature: or conversely, of nature in 
culture. They also give answ er to questions concerning the extent to which hum an 
intervention into natu re  and natural processes is desirable, necessary, or even possible. 
Ultimately, both  gardening and ecosystem m anagem ent point up, in practical ways, the 
increasingly "troubled borders" between culture and nature.  ̂ Nature, a t least our 
understanding  and valuation of it, has changed (and will continue to change) over the
1 Michael Pollan, Second Nature, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1991), pp. 1-2.
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centuries, and  our activities have altered accordingly. With the advent of scientific 
"management," gcirdening, in its broadest sense, fell into disfavor. B ut emerging 
paradigm s of na tu re  and  the place of hum ans suggest th a t "gardening" might be Just the 
sort of activity to undertake when interacting with the world. It provides for a wide 
spectrum  of attitudes and activities, from the purely figurative arrangem ent of the world 
(the aesthetic eye th a t is inclined to see the garden in all of nature) to the actual 
intensive and extensive m anipulation of organic m aterials to su it a  desired end. In 
consulting the "Genius of the Place," in noting the "capabilities" of the landscape and 
then adhering to them  in our "place-making" efforts, we legitimate our role in the 
construction of the "home place." "Home places" are eimalgams of the made and the 
found, the success and longevity of which depend upon our willingness to read the 
landscape with an open mind. Gcirdening, like land m anagement, takes place in the 
liminal zones, those areas between the sacred and the profane; gardeners move easily 
between the utterly wild and the ultra-cultivated in a ceaseless effort to m aintain the 
tension between natu re  and civilization upon which hum an life depends.
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